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ABSTRACT 
Risk assessment is one of the key success factors of public-private partnerships (PPP) 
water projects.  Factors such as utility condition problems, unsustainable increase in water 
supply requirements, socio-technical issues and changes in government policies can cause 
such capital-intensive projects to overrun planned budget and schedule allocations.   
Where the project is a commercial asset, delayed completion time and cost overruns 
usually have significant impact on the profitability of the project as well as the estimated 
returns on investment over the operational phase of the project.  Understanding the 
specific risks involved in PPP water projects can be very crucial in designing containment 
measures to deal with their likely impact on the projects.  Through the combination of 
review of literature and questionnaires, different risk elements in PPP water projects were 
first identified.  The identified elements were then rated and prioritized using the 
Analytical Network Process (ANP) to demonstrate the complex interactions among those 
risks and to establish the most salient Value-for-Money (VFM) variables on PPP water 
projects.  The outcome of this research is an innovative ANP-based model known as the 
“Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” that offers a platform to incorporate tangible and 
intangible risk variables into a risk assessment process in water infrastructure projects.  
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Outliers 
 (1) 
Canadian hockey is a meritocracy.  Thousands of Canadian boys begin to play the sport at 
the “novice” level, before they were even in kindergarten.  From that point on, there are 
leagues for every age class, and at each of those levels, the players are sifted and sorted 
and evaluated, with the most talented separated and groomed for the next level.  By the 
time players reach their mid-teens, the very best of the best have been channelled into an 
elite league known as Major Junior A, which is the top of the pyramid.  And if your 
Major Junior team plays for the Memorial Cup, that means you are at the very top of the 
top of the pyramid. 
In the mid-1980s, a Canadian psychologist named Roger Barnsley was watching a game 
in the Major A hockey league with his family when his wife made an observation that an 
incredible number of the players were born in January, February, and March.  Barnsley 
was astonished when he went home that night and looked up the birth dates of as many 
professional hockey players as he could find as he saw the same pattern his wife noted.  
More players were born in January than in any other month, and by an overwhelming 
margin.  The second most frequent birth month? February.  The third? March.  Barnsley 
looked at the composition of the National Hockey League.  Same story.  The more he 
looked, the more he came to believe that this is a fact for Canadian hockey. 
The explanation for this is quite simple, it has nothing to do with astrology, nor is there 
something magical about the first three months of the year.  It is simply that in Canada the 
eligibility cut-off for age-class hockey is January 1st.  A boy who turns ten on January 2nd, 
then could be playing alongside someone who doesn’t turn ten until the end of the year, 
and – at that age – a twelve month gap in age represents an enormous difference in 
physical maturity.  When coaches are making the selection, they are tending to pick the 
bigger and more coordinated players who have had the benefit of extra months of 
maturity.  A selected player will get better coaching, and his team mates are better, and he 
plays more games and practices two or three times than he would have otherwise.  In the 
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beginning, this advantage is not so much but at the age of thirteen of fourteen, with the 
benefit of better coaching and all the extra practice under his belt, he really is better, so 
he’s the one more likely to make it to the Major Junior A League, and from there into the 
big leagues. - Malcolm Galdwell in his book “Outliers”. 
(2) 
In 1985, Maco authorities (China) signed a concession contract with a private company.  
The quantity and quality of water greatly improved.  Ten years later the city’s gross 
domestic product had tripled.  Maco today has one of the highest living standards 
anywhere in Asia.  Even though the improvement in water distribution is not the main 
reason for the economic miracle, it is unlikely that such impressive development would 
have been possible without it.  - Fredrik Segerfeldt in his book “Water for Sale”. 
 (3) 
By the end of 1993, the government of Peru had spent $3.4 billion on nine public sector 
large-scale water projects.  Although several of the projects had been completed decades 
earlier, they had achieved only 6.6 percent of anticipated outcome in terms of creating 
new land for farming, and not one single kilowatt-hour of electricity had been generated.  
The cost of irrigated farmland created came to between $10,000 and $56,000 per hectare, 
whereas normal irrigable land in the same region costs $3,000.  It would be not just a pity 
but quite outrageous if millions of people were to starve, fall ill, and die through water 
shortages brought about by the strident propaganda of vested interests and powerfully 
ideological movements with quite different ends in view. – Karen Bakker in her book 
“Privatizing Water”. 
(4) 
“The (World) Bank once had a quite different approach to public works: it was an 
enthusiastic financier of monumental projects, and would typically lend the money to 
build large dams.  Many of the dams were spectacular failures, delivering few, if any, 
benefits (except to politicians and construction firms) while displacing millions of people 
and leaving behind environmental destruction and public debts. The Bank is now getting 
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out of the dam business and into water privatization” – William Finnegan of the New 
Yorker.  
(5) 
According to proponents, private sector participation in the urban water supply sector 
displayed an impressive increase, both in terms of numbers of projects and investment. 
However, this data is disputed, and the World Bank has been accused of providing greatly 
overestimated statistics in private sector participation.  In any case, the observation is not 
universally true, as the level of private sector activity was spatially variable.  Concession 
contracts were rare in regions where overall investment was lowest.  The lowest income 
regions and countries tend to be disproportionately under-funded compared to middle-
income countries.  – Karen Bakker in her book “Privatizing Water”.  
The above noted examples confirm that the determination of a single “answer” for any 
single “question” is nearly impossible.  Different views leads to different answers for the 
same question, and without a common base of comparison, any answers could only end-
up being considered as outliers.  
1.2 Research Background 
The water sector has many characteristics that makes it challenging for private sector 
involvement. This includes a large fixed cost in its capital investment that has no 
alternative use (irreversible).  Such high fixed cost of water systems lead to economics of 
scale that contribute to conditions of natural monopoly.  Also, given the sensitivity of the 
water sector to public, the governments are typically heavily involved in regulating water 
services, which increases the regulatory and political risks to private companies 
undertaking this type of investment. 
In the early 1990s, market-driven approaches for water resources management started to 
gain acceptance. Privatization and decentralization have become the main reform policies 
of the major international organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).  Water became recognized as 
an economic good, i.e., a commodity that should be priced at its cost of provision 
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(including environmental externalities) and its true value to society (Ouyahia, 2006).  The 
number of people served to some extent by the private sector was 5% of the world’s 
population in 1999, increased to 10% in 2006, and 11% in 2008, and reached by 2012 
approximately 14% of the world’s population, with around 960 million people being 
served (Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012-2013).  The water PPP market includes 
well-established markets like: United Kingdom, United States, France, Italy, Spain and 
Germany.  Emerging markets includes mainly China, beside Brazil, India and Russia.  
However, the attraction of water infrastructure to investment is considered to be low 
when compared to other types of infrastructure.  As of 2005, privatization in water 
infrastructure attracted only 5% of the investment commitments in developing countries 
(Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005).  
 
The heated debate on the usefulness of private participation in the water sector is far from 
being settled. The proponents and opponents typically support their claims with figures 
that should strengthen each party’s arguments.  A critical review of the most common 
assumptions/allegations made by each party is discussed in this thesis.  In general, the 
proponents of water privatization have always linked the poor political condition in some 
countries to the deficiency in water supply management especially in third world 
countries.  This is a very general assumption that ignores the fact that the same political 
bodies will be responsible in engaging private sector parties in new water PPP projects.  
On the other side, the opponents have put most of their efforts opposing the concept of 
water privatization disregarding the currently known operation and management 
deficiencies under the public scheme. 
The literature review showed a severe drop in investment in water PPP between 2008 and 
2009 with a minor rebound rate.  Also, the cancellation rate of water PPP projects is about 
26% compared to 4% in electricity, 3% in telecom, and 13% in Natural Gas.  This has 
added to a heated debate between proponents and opponents of private participation in 
water infrastructure.   
Studying the risk assessment of Water-specific PPP remains very limited, where the risk 
identification is generally based on using generic lists of risks.  For risk evaluation, the 
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research work is generally adopts simple to fairly complex techniques that is not being 
utilized in industry practice. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The heated debate over private participation remains far from being settled.  Both 
proponents and opponents of water privatization support their claims with figures that 
should strengthen each party’s argument.  However, in the lack of a common base of 
comparative analysis, each party’s arguments are not indicative and could only be 
considered as outliers. 
The case was clearly summarized by Karen Bakker (2010): 
“Most of the debate has been centered on the relative merits of the public and 
private sector in managing large-scale reticulated water-supply networks.  
Unbiased research is rare; an examination of comparative performance is often 
influenced by ideological commitments.  It is thus somewhat predictable that 
proponents and opponents of water privatization rarely agree on research 
strategies.” 
Further to the above, the research on water infrastructure remains short of addressing the 
severe drop in the number of water PPP projects since 2008, where only a minor rebound 
in amount of investment occurred since then. 
 
Figure  1.1: Private Participation in Water Infrastructure between 2000 and 2015 
Source: World Bank Group (2015b). 
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This is in addition to the high percentage of cancelled/distressed projects in the water 
sector in comparison to other infrastructure sectors, with a percentage of approximately 
26% of the total investment made in this sector by 2015, compared to 4% in electricity, 
2% in telecom, and 13% in Natural Gas. The statistics of cancelled/distressed of various 
infrastructure sectors is presented in Figure  1.2, where the gap between the water sector 
and other sectors can be clearly observed. 
 
Figure  1.2: Percentage of Cancelled/Distressed Projects between 1990 and 2015. 
Source: World Bank (2015a). 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
Private sector involvement in water infrastructure is still a controversial issue, with a 
relatively weak record in the Water sector in comparison to other infrastructure sectors.  
In practice, the Government’s decision to proceed with Public-Private Partnerships is 
dependent on proving the value for this procurement model over the traditional 
procurement mechanism, through a process known as “Value-for-Money analysis”.  As 
such, it is foreseen that adopting an improved risk assessment model dor new Water PPP 
projects would allow for a  better evaluation of potential Water PPP projects. 
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
The study aims to develop a new risk assessment model for Water PPP projects that 
specifically addresses the risks associated with Water PPP projects, and through an 
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analytical model, it would allow for comprehensive and proactive risk management of 
Water PPP Projects. The model, which is utilizing the Analytical Network Process (ANP) 
methodology, will be useful to  governmental agencies for the assessment of risks 
effectively, efficiently and equitably, which will allow for a more reliable “Value-for-
Money” analysis, which deals with the evaluation of new PPP projects.  
To achieve the research aim, the following objectives were developed: 
Objective One: To identify and describe the significant risks associated with water PPP 
Projects with respect to cost and analyze the main reasons for projects’ cancelation. 
Objective Two: To analyze the interactions among the water-specific risks 
Objective Three: To assess the severity of the identified Water-Specific risks 
Objective Four: To develop a new model for the assessment of water-specific PPP risks 
1.6 Research Design 
As shown in Figure  1.3, the research started by conducting a comprehensive literature 
review (Stage 1) on Water Public-Private Partnerships (task A: Chapter 2), and Risk in 
Water Public-Private Partnerships (task B: Chapter 3).  At the end of stage 1, the research 
gap was identified. 
In stage 2 (Chapter 4: Research Methodology), the research gap (i.e. problem) was 
defined, the research questions were formulated, and the research objectives were formed, 
and the research design was completed (task C). 
In stage 3, the research objectives were tackled.  This includes the identification of the 
Water-Specific PPP Risks (task D: Chapter 5), and a questionnaire survey was issued to 
assess the severity of the identified risks (task E: Chapter 5). 
In stage 4, an improved risk analysis methodology was proposed (task F: Chapter 6), and 
based on the outcome of the questionnaire survey; the identified water-Specific PPP risks 
were prioritized (task G: Chapter 6).  
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In stage 5, the “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” was developed (task H: Chapter 6) and 
the validation of the proposed model was undertaken (task I: Chapter 6).  Finally, the 
conclusion and recommendations of the research was made, along with the 
recommendations for future research (task J: Chapter 7).  
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Figure  1.3: Research Plan 
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
The thesis comprises five stages that are represented in 7 chapters.  A brief introduction 
of each chapter is given under this section in order to outline the logical progression of 
the thesis. 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic and provides a brief overview of the thesis including a 
background to the subject, the research problem, aim and objectives, and the research 
design. 
Chapters 2 and 3 form the literature review. 
- Chapter 2 introduces the special features of water infrastructure, the background 
of Water Public-Private Partnerships and its various forms along with some 
market statistics, and concludes with a critical review of literature.  
- Chapter 3 presents the principles of risk management in Public-Private 
Partnerships, along with a review of research and industry practice with respect to 
water infrastructure.  The chapter concludes with a critical review of literature. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology adopted for the research.  It involves the 
systematic approach procedures upon which the research is based, the data is collected 
and interpreted, and the findings are evaluated. 
Chapter 5 presents the identified water-specific PPP risks along with an assessment of 
the main failure cases in the water PPP sector.  The chapter introduces the setup and 
conclusion of the questionnaire survey, undertaken to assess the severity of the identified 
risks.  
Chapter 6 presents the development of the substantive Analytic Network Process (ANP) 
model for the prioritization of the identified risks.  The chapter provides the calculation of 
the “Risk Priority Index, (RPI)” as a project ranking method for identified risks.  The 
chapter introduces the developed “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” along with the 
validation results. 
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Chapter 7 The chapter provides a review of the original research objectives and the 
extent at which they were achieved, where the main conclusions are to be presented and 
the limitations of the research to be acknowledged, with recommendations for further 
research.   
1.8 Research Limitations 
- This study particularly concentrated on the drinking water component, which may 
include raw water collection, transportation, and treatment or could be limited to 
water distribution to the consumers (private houses, industrial, commercial, or 
institution establishments).  The risk profile would vary depending on the project 
scope.  Such differentiation was not feasible in this research but could be 
considered as a future research prospective. 
- The risks elements considered in this research are those directly relevant to the 
Water PPP planning and subsequent operation and maintenance.  Other potential 
common PPP risks covering the social, construction, political aspects of the 
project should also be considered for a successful PPP, however are considered 
beyond the scope of this research.  Such demarcation should be reflected on the 
developed Water-Specific PPP Risk Model.  
- As with all survey based research there are bound to be limitations, which need to 
be acknowledged. Readers are therefore reminded of the potential effect of 
sampling, unsystematic (i.e. random) and measurement errors and their likely 
impact on the data collected, analysis undertaken and the conclusions drawn.   The 
demographic profile of the respondents suggests that they have reasonable 
involvement and direct professional experience, which should accord some 
reasonable credibility to the quality of responses received. 
It is also important to acknowledge the relatively small sample size used for the 
study.  However, this should not nullify the conclusions drawn, given that the 
relevant variation statistics showed a reasonable deviation. 
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- Furthermore, the researcher still lacked some real data to demonstrate the validity 
of the risk model developed by the proposed approach. Due to confidentiality 
reasons, it was not possible for public sector officials and contractors to disclose 
real data. It is therefore recommended, for future research, to test the model using 
real data. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: WATER PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter initiates the literature review of this research by presenting the specific 
features of the water sector and defining the term “Public-Private Partnerships (PPP or 
P3)” and its various forms.  This chapter also provides the background of PPP in the 
water sector with an overview of the water PPP market worldwide. 
The chapter concludes with a critical review of literature addressing the debate on the 
suitability of PPP for the water sector along with an analysis of the main water PPP 
market statistics. 
2.2 The Special Features of Water Infrastructure 
The water sector has many characteristics that makes it challenging for private sector 
involvement, as noted under this section. 
- Capital Investment 
The fixed cost associated with water infrastructure components like water distribution 
systems and storage / treatment plants is considered high when compared to other types of 
infrastructure. Besides, the water sector assets are mostly with no alternative use (i.e. 
irreversible).  According to Armstrong et al. (1994), fixed costs of water infrastructure in 
England and Wales represent 80 percent of total cost.  Another feature of water 
infrastructure is that 70-80 percent of the water infrastructure assets are underground 
(Infrastructure Canada, 2004) where uncertainty about the condition of assets (like 
underground pipelines) may discourage potential investors (Rees, 1998) or be a source of 
a potential claim after the contract is awarded (Penelope and Cowen, 1997). 
- Natural Monopoly 
Unlike other infrastructure sectors, the high fixed costs of water systems lead to 
economics of scale that contribute to conditions of natural monopoly (Ouyahia, 2006) 
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With the exception of construction, transportation, treatment and distribution of water are 
all normally spatial monopolies. 
- Health and Safety Regulations 
Given the sensitivity of the water sector to public, the governments are typically heavily 
involved in regulating water services, which increases the regulatory and political risks on 
private companies undertaking this type of investment.  
2.3 Water Public-Private Partnerships  
Hardcastle et al. (2003) defines Public-Private Partnerships (abbreviated as PPP or P3) as: 
“Any contractual arrangement between a public sector agency and a for-profit private 
sector concern, whereby resources and risks are shared for the purpose of delivery of a 
public service or development of public infrastructure”.  The forms of PPP would differ 
in the magnitude to which they move ownership, finance, and accountability out of the 
public sector into private hands.  A list of the main forms of PPP is presented in Table 
 2.1. 
In the early 1990s, market-driven approaches for water resources management started to 
gain acceptance. Privatization and decentralization have become the main reform policies 
of the major international organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).  PPP has been introduced as 
the most common scheme of project development. 
In 1992, 500 participants including experts representing 100 countries and 80 
international, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations attended the 
International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland.  At 
its closing session, the conference adopted the Dublin Statement. 
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Table  2.1: Types of Public-Private Partnership Contracts 
Adopted from Public-Private Partnership Handbook, Asian Development Bank, 2008 
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The Dublin Statement adopted four guiding principles to provide the framework for 
future actions (Ouyahia, 2006): 
- Principle No.1: Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain 
life, development and the environment. 
- Principle No.2: Water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels. 
- Principle No.3: Women play a central part in the provision, management and 
safeguarding of water. 
- Principle No. 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
should be recognized as an economic good. 
The “Dublin principles” were reiterated during the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio, 1992, where market-driven approaches for water 
resources management gained further acceptance.  Water was recognized as an economic 
good, i.e., a commodity that should be priced at its cost of provision (including 
environmental externalities) and its true value to society (Ouyahia, 2006).  Since that 
time, the heated debate over the success of this approach never stopped. 
For developing countries, the United Nations in its year 2000 Millennium Declaration, set 
eight goals for development, called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These 
goals set an ambitious agenda for improving the human condition by 2015.  In support of 
these goals, the Millennium Project was launched to recommend the best strategies for 
achieving the MDGs. 
Even in developed countries, the appropriate roles of the public and private sectors were 
also questioned. The current system dominated by public provision was perceived as 
inefficient and the private sector was introduced as a way of bringing innovative 
approaches, efficient management and cutting the cost of public subsidies or redirecting 
them to the poor. This radical change in public policy has occurred worldwide and for all 
infrastructure sectors (Ouyahia, 2006).  Decentralization policies and decline in 
government subsidies are occurring at a time when infrastructure needs to be renewed, 
whereas for developing countries and transitional economies the main challenge is 
investment in new infrastructure.  
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- Water PPP Market in the World 
The number of people served to some extent by the private sector was 5% of the world’s 
population in 1999, increased to 10% in 2006, and 11% in 2008, and reached by 2012 
approximately 14% of the world’s population, with around 960 million people being 
served (Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012-2013). 
- Water PPP in Well-established Markets 
There are six markets with an extensive private sector presence: United States, where a 
survey conducted in 1995 by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
found that 28,500 privately owned water systems served approximately 14 percent of the 
U.S. population (Brubaker, 2003). France where the private sector share was estimated at 
approximately 79% in 2005, Italy where 11% of the market was served by the private 
sector and semi-private companies in 1987; Spain where the private sector share was 
estimated at approximately 46% in 2005; Germany with approximately 8% of the market 
through long term, and England & Wales (Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012-2013).  
- Water PPP in Emerging Markets 
China has been seen as a large market of interest and it is considered as the single most 
important driver. Brazil, India, and Russia have been the main drivers of the market in 
recent years, and the pace of growth in China appears to be accelerating.  Over the past 
decade, they have accounted for 70% of the global market, chiefly driven by China’s need 
to modernize its infrastructure (Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012-2013). 
- Water PPP in the United Kingdom 
Water privatization started in 1989 by the government of Margaret Thatcher, which 
privatized the ten previously public regional water and sewerage companies in England 
and Wales through the sale of assets.  At the same time the economic regulatory agency 
OFWAT was created.  The Environment Agency was set responsible for environmental 
regulations, and the Drinking Water Inspectorate for regulating drinking water quality in 
the United Kingdom. 
 18 
 
However, the attraction of water infrastructure to investment is considered to be low 
when compared to other types of infrastructure.  As of 2005, privatization in water 
infrastructure attracted only 5% of the investment commitments in developing countries 
(Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005).  
 
Below are some further statistics of private sector participation in water projects (World 
Bank 2016): 
• Number of countries with private participation     64 
• Projects reaching financial closure      906  
• Total investment ($ Billion)       85 
• Region with largest investment: Latin America and the Caribbean   49% 
(Note: While China is considered as the largest market, the “East Asia and Pacific” 
comes second with respect to investment by region for private sector participation in 
the water sector) 
 
 
Figure  2.1: Private Participation in the Water Sector, between 1990 and 2015. 
Source: World Bank (2015a). 
• By 2012, almost 60 percent of projects were treatment plants, while the remaining 40 
percent were for utilities (World Bank, 2013).   
• Local operators were noted of increasingly being key sponsors of private water 
projects in developing countries as foreign private sponsors continue to reduce their 
participation.  Out of the new 35 projects in 2009, 26 projects were entirely 
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implemented by local private consortia.  The share of water projects with at least one 
foreign sponsor dropped from 48% in 2007 to 26% in 2009 (World Bank, 2015b). 
• Type of PPP with largest share in investment: Concession    62% 
Refer to Figure  2.2 for statistics of types of PPP implemented in the water sector:  
 
Figure  2.2: Types of PPPs in the Water Sector between 1990 and 2015. 
Source: World Bank (2015a). 
2.4 Drop in Water PPP Projects & High Rate of Project Cancellation/Distressing 
According to the World Bank data, a severe drop in the number of water PPP projects 
occurred between 2008 and 2009 where the number of new projects with private 
participation that reached financial or contractual closure in 2009 declined by 46% 
compared to 2008.  Annual investment commitments fell by 31% within the same period.  
To an extent, the drop has occurred across all infrastructure sectors due to the 2008 
financial crisis; however, it remains as a prolonged feature in the Water sector. 
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As shown in Figure  2.3 below, the same trend continued in 2010 and slightly improved 
since then.  
Figure  2.3: Private Participation in Water Infrastructure between 2000 and 2015 
Source: World Bank Group (2015b). 
Further to the above, by 2015, the percentage of cancelled/distressed projects in the water 
sector was highly increasing other infrastructure sector, with a percentage of 
approximately 26% of the total investment made in this sector, compared to 4% in 
electricity, 2% in telecom, and 13% in Natural Gas.  Reasons for cancelling/distressing of 
these contracts varied between cited underinvestment by the concessionaire, disagreement 
on tariff adjustments, or because the provincial government created a new state-owned 
water utility to operate the services.  The statistics of cancelled/distressed of various 
sectors is presented in Figure  2.4, where the gap between the water sector and other 
sectors can be clearly observed. 
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Figure  2.4: Percentage of Cancelled/Distressed Projects per Sector,  
for the period between 1990 and 2015.Source: World Bank (2015a). 
 
2.5 Critical Review of Literature 
2.5.1 Proponents versus Opponents of Private Sector Involvement in the Water Sector 
The proponents and opponents typically supported their claims with figures that should 
strengthen each party’s arguments.  A critical review of the most common 
assumptions/allegations made by each party is presented under this section. 
The proponents of water privatization have always linked the poor political condition in 
some countries to the deficiency in water supply management especially in third world 
countries.  This is a very general assumption that ignores the fact that the same political 
bodies will be responsible in engaging private sector parties in new water PPP projects, 
which in fact imposes a risk to new PPPs. Fall et al. (2009) reported mixed cases of 
success and failure in water PPP in Africa due to the different setups.  Fall (2009) noted 
that clarity of sector policies is a key to successful PPPs.  Even in developed countries, 
like in the case of Atlanta (USA), Brubaker (2003) reported how the governmental 
changes represented by the change of the mayor, has impacted the progress of its water 
PPP project.  As such, the assumption that the mis-management of political governments 
of water resources would only change if we switch to engaging the private sector is not 
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always valid.  Also, the assumption that private corporations will endeavour to lower their 
prices to gain more costumers is not always valid as this over-simplifies the issue.  In 
Atlanta, the private investor, upon appointment, reported to the city a backlog of between 
4,000 and 7,000 outstanding requests for service, some of which were three years old 
(Hardie, 1999).  A construction boom in the service area created additional demands.  This 
unexpected factor among others has caused the project to fail.  After a certain point, the 
increase in water supply may require additional resources (facilities, equipment, services, 
etc…) to maintain the same level of service, which will result in additional cost to the 
private corporation. The claimed success of water PPP projects in some developed 
countries cannot be considered as a proof of the success of the same PPP scheme 
elsewhere, especially in developing countries where the socio-political conditions may 
significantly vary.  Several experiences available in literature confirm the special nature 
of each project; several controversial cases have been reported by Segerfeldt (2005) and 
Bakker (2003). 
The assumption that poor people are ready to pay more for an improved service does not 
explain the social and political tension that water privatization face in first world 
countries like in USA and Canada.   
On the operation side, the assumption that the engagement of the private sector will lead 
to an immediate improvement to the service is not valid. Water spillage from pipes is a 
common source of under-performance due to the aging infrastructure where available 
records of previous maintenance activities is sometime missing or is not accurate.  This 
was noted by Brubaker (2003) in the case studies of Atlanta, USA and Halifax, Canada.  
Even with the availability of such records, the rehabilitation/maintenance of water pipes 
is facing limited budget allowances. The engagement of the private sector is not foreseen 
to change things radically in this regard. The assumption that private corporations will 
have the tendency to handle water with care is not always accurate given that the private 
sector is engaged in a pre-determined contract value over a certain period of time with a 
pre-agreed level of performance.  The increase of water supply may lead to increased 
effort (and cost) to comply with the operation contract requirements.   
Assuming that private sector will allow for more investment in research and development 
is not always accurate.  A relatively large amount of research is taking place in 
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developing improved strategies for water pipe maintenance and rehabilitation; however, 
governments mostly fund such research. 
The assumption that users, under the free water-pricing model, will have the option to 
seek an alternative in case of improper service is clearly not valid given the monopolistic 
nature of the water sector.  For instance, in England and Wales, water companies 
remained monopolies even after privatization (Ouyahia, 2006)    Also, the assumption 
that private entities will seek an improvement to their service for an increased use and 
earnings is not always accurate.  The additional use of resources can lead to additional 
investment in facilities so as to handle such increase and maintain the operation contract 
requirements. 
The proponents typically ignored the necessity of developing a water policy based on 
available resources and target achievements with respect to water access and quality.  The 
arrangement and coordination of new proposed projects should follow such policy.   
It was noted that the allegations sometimes made against building major infrastructure 
facilities (like dams) are generally unsubstantiated. As an example, the allegations made 
by Segerfeldt (2005) that the World Bank has led to many spectacular failures by 
investing in major public works like large dams is not substantiated.  Building dams, like 
other engineering projects, should have the associated engineering studies starting from 
preliminary design till detailed design to allow for the proper assessment, analysis, and 
subsequent execution.  Moreover, the reference by Segerfeldt (2005) to a major public 
works failure like in the Soviet Union that took place during the 1950s does not offer a 
scientifically acceptable basis for evaluation.  
Linking a proper water policy to market-driven policies is not valid.  In Chile, private 
ownership was introduced where landowners were given the right to own water and sell it 
at freely determined prices, where the model was proved to be successful (Segerfeldt 
(2005).  However, the success of such model in Chile does not necessarily guarantee that 
the same model is valid elsewhere, as engineering requirements beside political and social 
conditions should be studied on a case-by-case basis.  In any case, local residents are not 
expected to handle the overall planning of water supply but rather it should be by 
responsible organizations. 
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On the other side, the opponents have put most of their efforts opposing the concept of 
water privatization disregarding the occurring operation and management deficiencies 
under the current public scheme.   Brubaker (2003) considers that many municipal 
utilities are ill-equipped to deal with new challenges in the industry and lack the 
necessary expertise at all levels.  In-depth research on the matter is very limited.   
Bakker (2010) offers the most notable effort towards a more rational assessment of the 
situation.  Bakker’s analysis came from a different starting point of the debate, through 
focusing on issues of governance, where many issues are common between public and 
private parties.  However, Bakker generally implied a shared responsibility between the 
public and private sectors for the current on-going deficiencies in this sector. This ignores 
the fact that the majority of the services at its current conditions are being offered by the 
public sector with its known deficiencies. 
2.5.2 Drop in the Investment in Water PPP 
The research work addressing the drop in water PPP projects and its high cancellation rate 
is limited to industry reports / publications which are mostly driven by the ideological 
commitments of the authors or at least limited to the cases in-hand.  There is a need for an 
overall review of PPP as a procurement scheme, where the reasons for such drop are to be 
assessed and delineated by industry experts to a list of risks associated with water PPP. 
2.5.3 Concluding Remarks 
The heated debate over water privatization remains far from being settled.  Both 
proponents and opponents of water privatization are supporting their claims with figures 
that should strengthen each party’s argument. However, in the lack of a common base of 
comparative analysis, these arguments remain not conclusive of any facts.  This is 
accompanied by a severe drop in the number of Water PPP projects since 2008 and a high 
cancellation rate in comparison to other infrastructure sectors.  Research addressing 
reasons for the drop or for the high risk associated with this sector remains very limited 
and where it exists, is mostly driven by the ideological backgrounds of the authors. 
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This situation was clearly described by Bakker (2010): 
“Most of the debate has centered on the relative merits of the public and private 
sector in managing large-scale reticulated water-supply networks.  Unbiased 
research is rare; an examination of comparative performance is often influenced 
by ideological commitments.  It is thus somewhat predictable that proponents and 
opponents of water privatization rarely agree on research strategies.” 
Research on this matter is not expected to resolve this debate, since  there is no single 
answer for any single question.  Instead, the motivation for a research on this subject 
should aim to seek an improved risk assessment methodology of water PPP projects.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the specific nature of the water sector, which includes its intensive 
capital investment, natural monopoly, and the sensitivity of the associated health and 
safety regulations. 
The chapter also presented a definition of PPP as a contractual arrangement between a 
public sector agency and a for-profit private sector concern, presenting the various forms 
for such partnership. 
PPP in the water sector was noticeably advanced in the early 1990s, as market-driven 
approaches for water resources management started to gain acceptance. Privatization and 
decentralization have become the main reform policies of the major international 
organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development).   At the closing session of the International Conference 
on Water and the Environment (ICWE) held in Dublin, Ireland in 1992, the conference 
statement included a guideline that “Water has an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognized as an economic good”. PPP have been introduced as the 
most common scheme of project development.  
The number of people served to some extent by the private sector was 5% of the world’s 
population in 1999, increased to 10% in 2006, and 11% in 2008, and reached 
approximately 14% of the world’s population, with around 960 million people being 
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served (Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2012-2013).  However, such numbers should be 
considered in conjunction with a severe drop in investment in water PPP between 2008 
and 2009 with a minor rebound rate.  Also, the cancellation rate of water PPP projects is 
about 26% compared to 4% in electricity, 3% in telecom, and 13% in Natural Gas.  This 
has added to a heated debate between proponents and opponents of private participation 
in water infrastructure, a debate that is far from being settled.  This chapter concluded 
with a critical review of literature as it was noted that proponents and opponents of water 
privatization were mostly driven by ideological commitments.  The researcher analyzed 
the arguments made by both sides and suggested that research on this matter can allow for 
an improved risk assessment methodology of water PPP projects.  
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3 CHAPTER 3: RISK ASSESSMENT IN WATER PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter two, the debate over private sector involvement in water assets management 
was highlighted, where the assessment of the suitability of this procurement scheme for 
the water sector was observed to be mostly driven by ideological commitments rather 
than applying proper research basis.  This is accompanied with severe drop in the number 
of water PPP projects was highlighted, which implies the risky nature of the water sector. 
This chapter discusses the risk in water PPP.  For which, it explores the concept of risk 
management in PPP in general, and the risk assessment methods, in research, and in 
industry practice. 
3.2 Risk Management in Public-Private Partnerships 
PPPs are risk-sharing investments in the provision of public goods and services (EIB, 
2005). How risk is shared between the parties is central to the PPP arrangement 
(Chapman, 1997).  An array of documents has been published with the aim of providing 
guidance for practitioners undertaking the Risk Management process.  
A fundamental principle is that risks should be allocated to the party that is best able to 
manage the risk in a cost-effective manner, as pointed-out by Grimsey and Lewis (2002). 
The risk allocation in PPP projects is fundamentally different to that in traditional projects 
as the latter include finance and operational risks to the private party.  Zou et al. (2008) 
describes the different types of construction contracts and their risk-sharing extent for 
government and private sectors as shown in Figure  3.1.  
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Figure  3.1: Risk-sharing Extent for Government and Private Sectors 
A systematic risk management allows early detection of risks and in turn responses by 
stakeholders (Broome and Perry 2002; Akbiyikli and Eaton 2004)).  Ng and Loosemore 
(2007) highlighted the drawbacks of inappropriate risk allocation and proposed a 
respective framework. Li et al. (2005) presented a process of negotiation (Figure  3.2) for 
risk allocation, which combines the approach, proposed by Al-Bahar and Crandall (1990) 
with the principle of risk sharing in PPP/PFI procurement supported by Grant (1996) and 
HM Treasury (2000). 
 
Figure  3.2: Risk Allocation in PPP Procurement  
Proposed by Li et al. 2005 
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Wang et al. (2000) stated that proper assessment of project risks can only be achieved 
from a life cycle perspective starting at the feasibility study stage and carried-out right 
through the operation and transfer stages with continuous monitoring.  Zou et al. (2008) 
studied several case studies through the life cycle of these projects, and proposed the 
framework shown in Figure  3.3. 
 
Figure  3.3: Risk Allocation Framework  
Proposed by Zou et al. 2008 
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3.3 Risk Assessment in Public-Private Partnerships Projects 
A systematic process of risk management can be divided into risk identification, risk 
evaluation and risk treatment, where risk treatment can be further divided into four 
actions: Risk retention, reduction, transfer, or avoidance (Berkeley et al., 1991; Flanagan 
and Norman, 1993). 
3.3.1 Risk Identification 
The most logical approach to identify risks in research work was to conduct a literature 
review where previous studies were used to identify potential risks.  Voleker et al. (2008) 
conducted a literature review to identify the political risk perception in Indonesian power 
projects. Jin and Doloi (2008) conducted a literature review to identify “Environment 
risks” in their research on the interpretation of risk allocation mechanism in PPP.  Chan et 
al. (2011) studied the risk assessment and allocation of PPP Projects in China at which a 
total of 34 risk factors were identified after conducting an extensive literature review.  
Wang et al. (2000) conducted a study to identify and evaluate the critical political and 
force majeure risks associated with China’s BOT projects, which included identifying the 
critical risks through a comprehensive literature review.   
Some researchers used a “quantitative content analysis” to identify risks in previous 
literature. The quantitative content analysis extends the approach of the qualitative form 
to yield numerical values of the categorized data (frequencies, ratings, ranking, etc.), 
which may be subject to statistical analyses.  Xu et al. (2010) used this technique by 
conducting the comprehensive literature review and content analysis, a total of 34 risk 
factors for PPP projects were identified.  
Some researchers used pre-determined existing lists to identify risks.  UNIDO (1996) 
developed a checklist classifying risks under two major categories (general/country risks 
and specific project risks).  Political risks, commercial risks and legal risks are classified 
in the first category, whereas construction/completion risks and operating risks fall into 
the second category.   
Case studies have also been used as an effective approach to investigate PPP applications 
to capture specific project features, gain detailed understanding of its implementation, and 
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draw useful implications. Stager (1996) summarized the problems during the execution of 
a Finance-Design-Build highway project in Turkey. Ng and Loosemore (2007) presented 
a review of risk allocation in PPP projects and a case study of the controversial $920 
million New Southern Railway project in Sydney, Australia. It mainly analyzed the 
rationale behind decisions about risk distributions between public and private sectors and 
their consequences. Zheng (2010) studied the first PPP application in Taiwan’s 
wastewater treatment sector which presented a study of the tender process, concession 
agreement, financial structure, payment mechanism, and risk management.  Gupta and 
Sravat (1998) concluded the significant risks in an Indian power project as development 
and construction risk, operation and maintenance risk, fuel supply and transportation risk, 
foreign exchange risk, non-payment risk and regulatory risk occurred, with the political 
risk of local government. Singh and Kalidindi (2006) studied through a case study, the 
“Annuity Model” which is a traffic risk-neutral PPP model built to overcome the traffic 
revenue risk that was identified as one of the most critical risks impacting the commercial 
success of the Indian road projects procured through PPP mode.  Lam (1999) studied 
previous projects that ran into daunting risks resulting in their cancellation, serious delay 
and cost overruns in attempt to draw lessons from them.  Songer et al. (1997) studied 
through a case study the risk of revenue-dependent infrastructure projects. 
Questionnaire surveys have been typically the research method used for risk evaluation 
and/or allocation while in some cases generated additional risks that should be 
considered. Wang et al. (1999) carried out an international survey among project 
sponsors, developers, consultants, lawyers, lenders, investors and contractors about 
critical risks concerned.  Akintoye et al. (1998) carried out research on risk 
assessment/prioritization for private finance initiative (PFI) projects in the UK.  The study 
noted that every party put the risks related to his line as the most significant. 
Questionnaire survey dominated most of the research work (Chan et al. 2011, Wang et al. 
2000, Jin and Doloi 2008, Roumboutsos et al. 2008, Akintoye et al. 1998, Wang et al. 
2004). 
Voelker et al. (2008) conducted unstructured interviews to confirm/update the findings of 
the initial literature review.  
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Xu et al. (2010) developed a risk assessment model for PPP projects in China, where the 
concept was adopted from a previous research, where the risks were identified in stages; 
first through a comprehensive literature review and more risks were identified at a 
subsequent two-round Delphi questionnaire survey.  
3.3.2 Risk Evaluation  
For the most part, decision-makers tend to concentrate on single values of outcomes, such 
as profit, which have been calculated from single value estimates and variables (Flanagan 
and Norman, 1993).  This approach is not suitable for construction projects that would 
include low and high risks, where the decision maker should be able to evaluate each and 
every risk that is identified for his project. 
Qualitative: Using qualitative techniques, the negative outcome of an activity is 
expressed in terms of probability or likelihood, and impact or consequence.  These are 
done subjectively, where the likelihood of occurrence and level of impact of risks can be 
assessed as low, moderate or high (Akintoye et al. 2000, DELG, 2000).  Qualitative 
analysis can be considered for an initial screening of project risks, or when a quick 
assessment is desired.  
Semi-Quantitative: Semi-quantitative assessment attributes numerical values to impact, 
probability, or frequency.  Normally, the probability is assessed subjectively as in 
qualitative assessment, but the impact of a risk is assessed quantitatively in monetary 
terms (Akintoye et al., 2000). 
Quantitative: The assessments are done in numeric terms, by pricing the consequence 
using a monetary unit.  Of these techniques, those considered to be of most relevance to 
the construction industry are listed as (Akintoye et al. 2000, DELG, 2000). 
- Sensitivity Analysis 
This is the simplest form of risk analysis.  It seeks to assess the effect on a project by 
changing a single variable within it (Flanagan and Norman, 1993).  In practice, this 
analysis is applied only to variables that are particularly important in terms of cost, time 
or economic return, or to the project as a whole.  The technique has several weaknesses 
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(Woodward, 1995), such as: the variables are treated individually, which makes it 
difficult to assess their importance in combination, and that these is no indication in the 
severity diagram of the anticipated probability of occurrence.  Sensitivity has been 
brought to be inferior to simulation for the very reason that probabilities are not used 
(Woodward, 1995). 
- Probability Analysis 
This is a more sophisticated form of risk analysis that overcomes the limitations noted in 
sensitivity analysis by specifying a probability distribution for each variable and then 
considering situations where any, or all, of them can change their initial values at the 
same time (Reutlinger et al., 1970; Flanagan and Norman, 1993).  Probability analysis 
has been deemed to be useful where there is a history of outcomes that can be aggregated 
to produce objective probabilities.  When there is no historical data, it becomes highly 
subjective (Tweeds, 1996). 
- The Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation is used to study the effect of the variability of input factors 
on an outcome (Newton, 1992).  It consists of simulation by means of random numbers.  
It provides an extremely powerful method of incorporating probabilistic data.  The Monte 
Carlo simulation will require sets of random numbers to be generated for use in testing 
various options.  Simulation makes the assumption that parameters subject to uncertainty 
can be described by probability distributions (Flanagan and Norman, 1993).   
- Decision Tree Analysis 
A decision tree is a means of setting out problems that are characterized by a series of 
decisions.  It shows a sequence of decisions and the expected outcomes under each 
possible set of circumstances.  The stochastic decision tree approach provides another 
method of analysing decision problems over time.  It combines the logic of decision tree 
analysis with the Monte Carlo simulation approach used in risk analysis.  Obviously the 
accuracy of the “Decision Tree Analysis” method depends upon the accuracy of the 
expected outcome and the probabilities. 
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3.3.3 Risk Treatment 
Risk treatment can be divided into four categories: avoidance, reduction, transfer, and 
retention, as described below: 
• Risk avoidance requires altering the project original plan so as to avoid a certain 
activity that carries a very high risk.  
• Risk reduction: Applying certain methods that reduce the probability of a risk 
occurring, or reducing the severity of the impact of a risk on the outcome of the 
project. 
• Risk transfer: When selecting to move the ownership of a certain risk to another 
party.  This may include moving the risk to a third part through a contract 
agreement 
• Risk retention: Accepting to carry the responsibility for certain risks in the project 
which cannot be avoided or transferred. 
3.4 PPP Risk Categories 
Some researchers categorized risks in construction projects broadly into general groups 
(i.e. internal and external) while others classified risks in more details: political risks, 
financial risks, market risks, intellectual property risks, safety risks, etc. (Songer et al., 
1997).   Relevant to PPP, UNIDO (1996) developed a checklist classifying risks under 
two major categories (general/country risks and specific project risks). At which, political 
risks, commercial risks and legal risks are classified in the first category, whereas 
construction/completion risks and operating risks fall into the second category.  Standard 
and Poor’s considers several broad areas that can potentially affect a PPP project’s 
creditworthiness. These are credit risk of the public sector entity, construction risks, 
revenue structure, operating risk, financial, and legal structure.  
Similarly, Grimsey and Lewis (2007) identified six areas of risk associated with PPP 
projects, namely; public risk; asset risk, operating risk, sponsor risk, financial risk and 
default risk.  Tiong et al. (1992) cited that BOT projects could be divided into five 
phases, namely `Pre-investment’, `Implementation’, `Construction’, `Operations’ and 
`Transfer’.  A series of risks involved in a certain phase of BOT was summarised by 
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Woody and Pourian (1992) into five groups. These are start-up cost risk, operating risk, 
technology risk, market risk and political risk.  Wang et al. (2004) conducted a survey 
and twenty-eight critical risks were identified, categorized into three (country, market and 
project) hierarchical levels.  Ernst and Pham (1995) identified a number of risks with 
regard to BOT project financing which can be categorized into: construction risks; 
performance; technology risks; force-majeure risks; and economic performance risks.  
Political and legal Risks: Wang et al. (2000) studied the political risks in China’s 
infrastructures projects.  The study identified from literature review a total of 34 risks 
which was filtered through discussions and interviews and was later submitted as a 
questionnaire to evaluate the criticality of these risks. The risks identified were 
categorized into: (1) Political and force majeure risks and, (2) Foreign exchange and 
revenue risks.  Voelker et al. (2008) studied the political risk perception in Indonesian 
power projects.  The study included a comprehensive literature review which generated 
an initial list of specific political risks, derived from MIGA (1985) and Sachs (2006), 
which could be classified as follows: Currency transfer, expropriation and similar 
measures, breach of contract; water and civil defence, war and civil disturbance, legal, 
regulatory and bureaucratic risks; and non-governmental action risks.  The identified risks 
were filtered through subsequent interviews before being issued through a questionnaire 
survey to evaluate the risks and their allocation.  
Financial Risks: These form a considerable set of risks in PPP projects and therefore was 
consistently part of the research work. Chen et al. (2011) identified the direct economic 
risks, which included interest rate fluctuation, foreign exchange fluctuation, inflation, and 
financing risk.  However, a broader view would show that all the risks inherited in PPP 
projects would impact the financial model of the concessionaire.  Zhang (2005) studied 
the concessionaire’s financial capability in developing BOT type infrastructure project as 
an important prerequisite to the success of this type of projects.  As the concessionaire is 
exposed to a wide range of risks, Zhang introduced from pervious literature the financial 
consequences of some risks and the mitigation measures.  In his research, a common set 
of 35 financial criteria has been identified through a systematic research approach, and 
their relative significances were determined based on worldwide expert opinions solicited 
by a structured questionnaire survey.  Lam and Chow (1999) explored the significance of 
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the risk characteristics of BOT projects from the financial point of view. ‘Interest rate 
fluctuation’ was the most significant financial risk variable in the pre-investment phase. 
For the implementation phase, both the variables ‘design deficiency’ and ‘time overrun’ 
was found to be highly statistically significant. The variable ‘time overrun’ was found to 
be the most statistically significant in the construction phase. The majority of the risk 
variables were considered to be moderately significant in the operations phase. Zou et al. 
(2008) studied the Sydney Cross City Tunnel PPP in Australia and the financial risk 
resulted from less-than-expected appeal to users.  Zou et al. (2008) also studied the 
Sydney Airport Railway Link, which ran into extra cost and high return on investment 
from the private sector side, which is resulted in high-ticket pricing and in turn less users 
and in turn less revenue.  Kapila and Hendrickson (2001) studied the currency exchange 
rate risk on international construction firms and ways to manage this risk. Xenidis and 
Angelidis (2005) looked into risk allocation of financial risks.  Sachs (2006) looked into 
quantifying qualitative information on risks (QQIR) is structured finance transaction. 
Social Risks:  In many incidents, the social risks led by public sector have led to serious 
results, which resulted in tense negotiations.  Such negotiations typically led to one party 
carrying more obligations and responsibility, and in some cases the projects were 
cancelled as a result of such disputes.  Obviously, such scenarios are more expected on 
PPP projects of social-related projects, and when multi-national companies lack the 
necessary local experience where new projects are being implemented.  Zou et al. (2008) 
study of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel and the Airport Railway Link are good examples 
on how the lack of public appeal to use new facilities would adversely impact PPP 
projects.   In some cases, failure to provide services raised public heat like the case of Dar 
el Salaam water supply project in Tanzania in 2005.  Proponents of the project had 
promised that involvement of private sector (Biwater) would resolve the water supply 
crisis in Dar el Salaam yet the subsequent failure of Biwater to meet the expectations, 
however, the tense negotiations and the increasing public pressure led to project 
cancellation (Bakker, 2010).  Another component of social risks, which is the soft aspect 
of risks, such as interpersonal communication, has generally received little attention to 
date in construction-related research (Edwards and Bowen, 1998). The soft aspects of 
risks may carry significant risks for companies involved in new markets. 
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Design and Construction Risks:  Design is a significant risk in successful project 
development (Li, 2003) where the design deficiency may cause the risk of not meeting 
the necessary authority approvals or impacting the construction and maintenance costs as 
noted by Partnership Victoria (Victoria, 2001). Design variations (Dawood et al., 2001) 
may increase project direct cost and time, and may impact the construction schedule 
leading to additional time and cost overrun. 
3.5 Risk Assessment in Water Public-Private Partnerships 
3.5.1 Research Work 
Water supply projects procured through PPPs are exposed to a plethora of risks than other 
infrastructure projects.  Shrestha and Martek (2015) studied the legal risks in water PPPs 
in China, throughout the life cycle of the project addressing the following stages: 1- 
Procurement, 2- Construction, and 3- Operation.  The study concluded that legal risk is 
present at all three stages, at close to moderate levels, with risk significance greatest at the 
operational stage.  Ameyaw and Chan (2013) studied the key risk factors for water PPP 
projects in Ghana.  The study ranked identified risks using the Delphi technique, and 
concluded with the top five risks: foreign exchange rate, corruption, water theft, non-
payment of bills and political interference.  Choi et al. (2010) studied the risk factors 
affecting foreign investment in China’s PPP water market.  The study concluded with 
tariff review uncertainty, abolishment of the fixed-return policy, and government breach 
of contract, immature domestic banking/financial systems and uneconomic pricing of 
water as the main factors.  Wibowo and Mohamed (2010) investigated risks and risk 
sharing practice in the Indonesian water sector. Zeng et al. (2008) studied the risks in 
China’s BOT water projects, and concluded that tax, informal competition, inflation rate, 
interest rate volatility, raw water price instability, foreign exchange fluctuation, lower-
than expected demand, and industrial policy change are the main risks impeding new 
projects.  Xu et al. (2011) identified the important risk items affecting performance of 
PPP water projects.  Harris et al. (2003) studied drivers for cancelation of PPP projects in 
developing countries, and find three key factors: price increases, difficulties in collection 
and poor project design.   Vives et al. (2006) presented the eight most common principal 
factors associated with water PPPs as legal framework, fiscal space, political 
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environment, macroeconomic conditions, institutional capacity, willingness to pay for 
services, tariff sustainability, and size and location of project.  
3.5.2 Industry Practice 
In industry practice, two financial models are typically developed; one named “Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC)” is typically developed by estimating the total project cost if 
the project is delivered by public sector, and another financial model named “Adjusted 
Shadow Bid (ASB)” is developed by estimating the total project cost if the project is 
delivered using private sector or Public-Private Partnership.  The difference between the 
estimated total project costs under each model is the “Value-for-Money (VFM)”.  In 
order for a governmental agency to proceed with a PPP project, a positive “value-for-
money” assessment should be proved.  If the adjusted shadow bid is less than the public 
sector comparator, there is positive value for money by procuring a project using private 
sector.  An illustrative example is shown on Figure  3.4 below.  
 
Figure  3.4: Illustrative Example of Value for Money Assessment 
As shown on Figure  3.4, the magnitude of the cost components varies between the two 
different models.  For the above example, the VFM estimated in percentage terms is as 
follows: 
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Traditional Project Cost under PSC – Project Cost under ASB  
Traditional Project Cost under PSC 
- Example: Assessment of City of Regina Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion 
This section provides a published real case of assessment of a new water PPP project that 
was undertaken by the City of Regina, Canada.  According to the Canadian PPP 
assessment guidelines, the decision to proceed with a new PPP project should be 
concluded after conducting three stages; screening assessment, strategic assessment, then 
concluded with the value-for-money assessment. 
1. Screening Assessment: aims to determine the potential suitability of the project for 
PPP delivery. At a workshop in April 2012, the project was screened against a set of 
standard PPP-suitability assessment criteria as shown in Table  3.1. 
Table  3.1: Screening Criteria 
Criteria  Assessment 
Suitable for 
PPP? 
Duration and 
Technological 
Change 
Is the capital asset of an enduring, long-lived nature and is the 
service life of the asset at least 20 years? 
Yes 
Is there a significant long term maintenance, operation, or service 
need associated with the capital project 
Yes 
Are the capital asset and service needs sustainable and the risk of 
technological change minimal over the entire service life of the P3 
Yes 
Legal Barriers 
Is the proposed P3 approach or the provision of the service free of 
any potential legal conflict with legislative or regulatory prohibitions 
or substantial restrictions (that cannot be changed in the short 
term)? 
Yes 
Affordability 
Can payment be tied to measured performance? Yes 
Is there a potential revenue opportunity for the private sector 
partner, which can be also tied to performance? 
Yes 
Project Risk 
Are there risks associated with traditional procurement that might be 
better managed by a private partner? 
Yes 
Project Size 
Can the project be bundled with one or more other similar projects to 
achieve economies of scale and a larger project size more suitable 
for P3? 
Yes 
Specifications 
Can the capital asset and related services be defined in a 
performance or output specification? 
Yes 
Integration 
Is the project relatively independent of other City projects, 
infrastructure, or control systems? 
Yes, except for 
McCarthy 
Boulevard 
Pump Station 
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Human 
Resources 
Does the project, if delivered by a private partner, obviate any 
current City staff positions? 
Yes 
2. Strategic Assessment: This stage undertakes a more detailed examination of the 
risks, costs, market of services provides objectives, and constraints.  The intent of the 
strategic assessment is to examine not just PPP models, but also all models under 
consideration. For this project, this was accomplished through three stages: 
a) A “market sounding” to determine the capacity of the market to participate in 
various delivery models.  At an initial stage started in August 2012, eight firms 
representing designers, constructors, and investors were interviewed to examine 
the interest to the project.  The outcome showed the potential of this project to 
attract competition.  At a subsequent stage carried in December 2012, more 
research was done with more focus on the DBOM and DBFOM models.  The 
information obtained was to be utilized for the preparation of the procurement 
documents and on the evaluation.  Overall, it was determined that any of the 
models under consideration can be expected to attract sufficient competition from 
the marketplace, and therefore market interest is not a governing factor in 
selection of the delivery model for the Project. 
b) A “qualitative risk assessment” was undertaken to identify the project’s risks and 
assess the relative risk-mitigation benefits of the various delivery models.  Each 
alternative model presents a different risk profile due to the different allocation of 
risks between the city and the contractor.  The main target of this exercise is to try 
to identify the delivery model with the least project risk, which in turn makes 
costs more certain.  As such, a risk workshop was conducted to identify the key 
project risks, assess the probability and impact of the risks, qualitatively, for each 
model, and prepare the project team for a future quantitative risk assessment to be 
done as part of the value for money assessment.  Approximately 50 different 
project risks were considered, with the workshop panel providing a consensus 
view on the probability of each risk occurring, and the impact if it occurred.  From 
this data, a total project risk score was calculated for each delivery model.  The 
total risk scores provide a basis for comparing the overall risk profiles of the 
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delivery models.  The higher the total risk score, the higher the overall project risk 
score profile.  Plotted on a continuum, the results were as follows: 
 
Figure  3.5: Results of Qualitative Risk Assessment - Total Risk Scores 
Based on this analysis, it was foreseen that DBB (Design-Bid-Build) presents the 
highest overall project risk, and DBFOM the lowest.  The risk profile is different for 
each delivery model because of the different allocation of responsibilities and risks 
between the city and the contractor, as defined in typical contract documentation. 
c) A multi-criteria analysis to qualitatively assess the delivery models on a number 
of weighted criteria derived from project objectives and constraints.  The 
qualitative assessment of the delivery models was conducted using a weighted-
criteria technique where the assessment criteria were developed based on previous 
experiences. 
Each procurement model was assessed against twenty-one criteria on a comparative 
basis relative to the baseline DBB model. The results indicated that all of the 
alternative models are believed to address the criteria better than DBB, with DBFOM 
having the greatest benefit. The general scoring outcome showed that the more that a 
delivery model allows the transfer of project responsibility and risk to a contractor, 
the better it meets the City’s criteria.  However, it is noted that despite their overall 
high scores, the two PPP models (DBFOM, DBOM) scored lower than DBB in the 
risks associated with the “social” category due to potential public concern with the 
transfer of WWTP operating responsibility. The report suggested that the concern is 
not on the transfer itself (i.e. the ability to undertake or the effectiveness of the 
transfer), but rather a potential reduction in public support for the project if delivered 
as a PPP. 
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3. Value for Money Assessment: This stage could be considered as an extension to the 
strategic assessment as it includes quantification of project risks and a preliminary 
comparison of the relative cost of traditional procurement and PPP procurement 
through cash flow modeling. In completion of the risk workshop that formed part of 
the strategic assessment, the risk costs for the projects were estimated to develop an 
estimate of the risk that is retained by the city, and transferred to the contractor, in 
each model.  The ten largest risks quantified for the DBB were as follows: 
Table  3.2: Ten Largest Quantified Project Risks 
Risk Description 
Resource Capacity City is not able to adequately support the procurement 
Facility Design 
Design contains errors or omissions that are not discovered until the 
construction period, i.e. contractor-initiated change order risks 
Major maintenance / 
rehabilitation 
Major maintenance is deferred 
Staffing Unable to recruit and retain qualified WWTP operating staff 
Delay by Owner (City) Facility not constructed on time due to City-induced delays 
Unknown condition of 
existing assets 
There are unknown defects in the existing WWTP components that 
are intended to be reused 
Construction - Operation 
coordination 
Risk associated with operating the WWTP during the construction 
of the upgrade/expansion 
Early Expansion WWTP capacity needs to expand sooner than anticipated 
Scope of changes during 
construction 
Changes to the design are demanded by the operator (City in the 
case of DBB) during construction 
Construction delay 
Facility not constructed on time for all reasons other than City-
induced delay 
 
The estimated cost of each quantified risk takes the form of a risk distribution with a 
range of possible outcomes ranging from best case to worst case.  To add the risks 
together into an estimate of total project risk, a Monte Carlo simulation is used.  Figure 
 3.6 presents the total estimated project risk cost distribution (as NPV) for each delivery 
model.  The figure illustrates, for example, that the estimated NPV risk cost for the DBB 
delivery model (in red) could be as low as $33.6 million and as high as $91.2 million.  
The figure also illustrates the two alternative models are expected to reduce the total 
project risk, since their distribution are to the left of the DBB distribution.  The risk cost 
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distribution is tallest and narrowest for DBFOM, meaning the total risk costs are more 
predictable than the wider distributions. 
 
Figure  3.6: Total Project Risk Costs for Each Delivery Model  
(NPV, $thousands) 
The cost estimates and risk cost estimates are added together to arrive at the estimated 
risk-adjusted net present value cost for each delivery model as noted in Table  3.3.  
Table  3.3: Preliminary Value for Money Estimates 
 (NPV, $thousands) 
 
DBB CMAR + DB DBFOM 
Total Project Base Cost 452,872 434,059 460,174 
Retained Risk 60,905 43,087 12,686 
Risk Premium 767 1,198 6,369 
Total Risk - Adjusted Project Risk 514,545 478,344 479,228 
"Project VFM"  7.0% 6.9% 
Echoing the strategic assessment, both alternative models (DBFOM and CMAR + DB) 
showed benefit over DBB. 
The VFM from the City’s perspective, however, does take a PPP Canada contribution 
into account. The contribution at 25% of eligible costs as defined by PPP Canada is 
estimated to be $51.2 million at the time of construction completion, or $44.3 million in 
net present value terms.  Table  3.4 presents the VFM from the City’s perspective 
considering PPP Canada contribution.  
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Table  3.4: Impact of PPP Canada Contribution on VFM  
(NPV, $thousands) 
 
DBB CMAR + DB DBFOM 
Total Project Base Cost 452,872 434,059 460,174 
Retained Risk 60,905 43,087 12,686 
Risk Premium 767 1,198 6,369 
Total Risk - Adjusted Project Risk 514,545 478,344 479,228 
PPP Canada Grant 
  
44,307 
Total Cost Net of PPP Canada Grant 514,545 478,344 434,921 
"VFM from City's prospective" 
 
7.0% 15.5% 
 
The VFM is illustrated visually on Figure  3.7.  As noted in the figure, both alternative 
models (DBFOM and CMAR + DB) showed benefit over DBB, because their cost 
distributions are positioned to the left of DBB along the cost axis.  The results in the form 
of risk distributions illustrate the possible range of project cost outcomes, from the best 
case through to the worst-case outcome. The relative cost-certainty of the models is 
illustrated, with narrow distributions being more cost-certain. 
 
 Figure  3.7: Total Risk-Adjusted Project Cost Estimates  
(NPV, $thousands) 
The VFM from the City’s perspective, taking the PPP Canada contribution into account, 
is highest for DBFOM. The impact of the PPP Canada contribution is referred to by PPP 
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Canada as the “incrementally” of the grant. The chart below illustrates the VFM of the 
DBFOM model.  
 
Figure  3.8: VFM From City's Perspective for DBFOM Model (Expected Value of Risk) 
3.6 Critical Review of Literature 
- Scarcity of Water PPP Studies: Research specific to water infrastructure is 
generally rare. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) noted that some of the water sector-
specific studies are relatively dated.  This is particularly significant given the large 
drop in the number of water PPP projects post 2008, where research work 
addressing this fact was not identified throughout the literature review process. 
- Generic rather than specific list of risks:  Cheung and Chan (2011) compared 
the risk factors across transportation, water/wastewater, and power PPPs in China.  
The study concluded that the critical risk factors that are frequently encountered in 
water/wastewater projects differ from those of the other two infrastructure 
projects.  However, the literature review showed that research identification has 
typically adopted a generic set of risks without giving consideration to the special 
features of water projects. 
In industry, the situation is not any better as specifically noted in the case of 
Infrastructure Ontario hiring a consultant for generating a general risk matrix to 
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facilitate establishing the VFM analysis of future PPP Projects (Infrastructure 
Ontario, Build Finance Risk Analysis and Risk Matrix, dated 2007).  While this 
list was meant as a starting point, it is still advisable to generate sector-specific 
lists adopting benchmark values for an improved risk assessment. 
- Subjectivity in risk identification:  In research work, most of the risk lists were 
based on limited survey samples.  Most of the conducted studies addressed China 
projects because of its active role using PPP to develop its water infrastructure.  
The results of such results may not be applicable in other geographical areas.  
In Industry, the risk identification exercise is based on the input of the technical 
consultant hired to conduct the VFM analysis through a risk workshop. This 
makes the analysis highly subjective as presented earlier in this chapter under the 
“Assessment of Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion & Upgrade Project” 
conducted by the City of Regina, Canada.  The use of previous experiences to 
achieve benchmarking values of risks across a wider scale of experts is necessary 
for an improved risk assessment. 
- Risk Assessment:  Methods for the assessment of the significance of the risks, 
researchers have gone from fairly simple qualitative to implementing 
sophisticated techniques while industry, for clear practical reasons, has adopted 
simple semi-quantitative techniques.  The consideration of more advanced semi-
quantitative techniques, like Analytical Hierarchy Process, which is simple to use 
and considers interdependency between the risk elements, may encourage industry 
to utilize the same technique given its practicality for industrial applications, 
which would allow for a far-improved evaluation of risks. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter is intended to provide a review of risk assessment in PPP with particular 
focus on water infrastructure. 
The chapter introduced the concept of risk management in PPP.  A fundamental principle 
is that risks should be allocated to the party that is best able to manage the risk in a cost-
 47 
 
effective manner.  The researchers considered that risk allocation in PPP projects is 
fundamentally different to that in traditional projects as the latter include finance and 
operational risks to the private party.  In that respect, several procedures have been 
recommended for the successful negotiation of risk allocation.   
The chapter also studied the risk assessment in PPP, where a systematic process of risk 
management can be divided into risk identification, risk evaluation and risk response, 
where risk response can be further divided into four actions (retention, reduction, transfer 
and avoidance).  The review of literature showed that risk identification has been 
undertaken through various methods, simply through the review of previous literature, or 
by using pre-determined existing lists, or through case studies, or through questionnaire 
survey, which have been the most common method.  In some cases, a mix between the 
above methods has been considered.  Risks are evaluated through qualitative, semi-
quantitative, or quantitative methods. 
The review of literature showed that some researchers categorized risks broadly into 
general groups (i.e. internal and external) while other researchers classified risks in more 
details: political risks, financial risks, market risks, intellectual property risks, safety risks, 
etc.  Some research work was concentrated on certain categories of risk like the research 
conducted on political, financial, commercial, social, and design and construction risks. 
Specific to risk assessment of water PPP projects, the amount of research work was found 
to be limited.  The industry practice typically incorporates risk assessment as part of the 
value-for-money analysis.  In order for a governmental agency to proceed with a PPP 
project, a positive “value-for-money” assessment should be proved.  The study of a “real-
case” assessment of a potential new project showed that the “value-for-money” stage 
comes after conducting a “Screening Assessment” to determine the potential suitability of 
the project for PPP delivery, and also after a “Strategic Assessment” which examines not 
just PPP models, but also all models under consideration.  
The critical review of literature indicated the need for additional scope-specific studies on 
water infrastructure where water-specific risks should be considered rather than 
depending on generic lists or earlier PPP studies.  This observation is also applicable to 
industry where generic risk lists are generally implemented for the assessment of any type 
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of PPP project.  The critical review also commented on the subjectivity involved in risk 
identification given the limited sampling typically used in research and industry 
applications.  
For risk evaluation, the critical review showed that research works mostly varied between 
adopting simple to complex techniques.  The researcher is of the point of view that 
adopting advanced semi-quantitative techniques, that consider the inter-dependency 
between the various risk elements, may offer a common platform between research and 
industry allowing for an opportunity to close the gap and develop benchmark values for 
risks for the future reference of practitioners and researchers.   
In chapter two, the limited, unsubstantiated evaluation of private involvement in the water 
sector was noted.  In chapter three, the review of research work and industry practice 
showed the absence of an advanced risk modelling methodology of water PPP.  
Considering the research questions evolved in Chapter 2 and 3, the next chapter will 
discuss the research methodology adopted for the research. It will involve the systematic 
approach procedures upon which the research is based, the data is collected and 
interpreted, and the findings are evaluated. 
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4  CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Ontology is concerned with the assumptions in conceptual reality and the question of 
existence apart from specific objects and events (Fellows and Liu, 2008). It answers the 
question ‘what is’? e.g. the ontological argument regarding the existence of God.  
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the presence of 
knowledge. Epistemology indicates that we know about something occurring because of 
the knowledge that we have about it. It answers the questions that begin in ‘how’ or 
‘what’? 
Remenyi et al. (1998) notes that for an appropriate research design, researchers must 
consider to which research community they believe they belong.  Recognizing the 
different views of ontological and epistemological philosophy can help to get the research 
work into perspective and ensure that it avoids making unsuitable claims for its results, 
overestimating what research can achieve by way of truth, certainty, and universality 
(Thomas, 2004). 
In chapter two, the limited, unsubstantiated evaluation of private involvement in the water 
sector was noted.  In chapter three, the review of research work and industry practice 
showed the absence of an advanced risk modelling methodology for water PPP, which is 
particularly significant given the heated debate over water PPP and the severe drop of 
Water PPP projects since 2008, which implies the risky nature of water PPP. This chapter 
discusses the research methodology adopted for the research.  It involves the systematic 
approach procedures upon which the research is based, the data is collected and 
interpreted, and the findings are evaluated.  
4.2 Research Paradigms 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) discussing philosophical paradigms identified two ontological 
assumptions: nominalism and realism, and two epistemological assumptions; 
subjectivism and objectivism.   Nominalism assumes that social reality is relative and that 
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we see reality as a projecting of our minds and consciousness whereas in realism, 
ontological reality is separate from the individual perception of it and is independent of 
the human consciousness.  The epistemology view of objectivism is that a scientific 
method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and 
human events occur. Subjectivism, as described by Cohen and Manion (2013), is a 
theoretical point of view that advocates the study of direct experience taken at face value; 
and one which sees behaviour as determined by the phenomena of experience rather than 
by external objective and physically described reality. Combinations between 
estipemological and ontological positions was identified by  Johnson et al. (1984) 
between all possible ways of integrating ontology and epistemology assumptions as 
presented in Table  4.1 below. 
Table  4.1: Research Design Paradigms 
Johnson et al. (1984) 
Paradigm Ontology Epistemology 
Positivism  Realist Objectivist 
Interpretivism Nominalist Subjectivist 
Empiricism Realist Subjectivist 
Rationalism Nominalist Objectivist 
As shown on Table  4.1 above, the combination of objectivism and subjectivism with the 
major two ontological positions, realism and nominalism, generates a four-way 
classification scheme.  Positivism combines realist ontology with objective epistemology; 
Subjectivism combines nominalist ontology with subjective epistemology.  Other 
paradigms like empiricism combine realist ontology with subjective epistemology, and 
rationalism combines nominalist ontology with objective epistemology.  
4.3 Philosophy of Research in Construction Management and Economics 
Construction management can broadly be described as the application of the principles of 
economics and management systems to the business and production processes of 
organizations that operate in the construction industry (McCaughey and Edum-Fotwe, 
1999). 
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Naoum (1998) stated that one of the problems of reading about research techniques is the 
terminology, adding that writers use terms that may be incomprehensible to other people.  
In literature, three methodological paradigms are typically outlined in the construction 
management research: Positivism, Interpretivism, and pragmatic approach.   
What is the appropriate paradigm for construction management research, Positivism or 
Interpretivism? This has been a point of debate in the construction management research, 
as well as in social science in general. Seymour et al. (1995) claimed that the research 
community is largely dominated by positivists (rationalists as noted in their text).  
Seymour et al. suggested that research adopting positivist paradigm would ignore 
people’s attitudes and beliefs and only concentrate on the casual understanding of the 
research topic.   They suggested that research in construction management should take a 
shift from objective reality, which is adopted by positivists into subjective experience, 
which is adopted by interpretivists.  While Runeson (1997) points-out that scientific 
research is about providing results that could be assessed which is not feasible when only 
a normative advice is provided to practitioners.  Runeson also points-out that science is 
always about establishing casualty, about formulating conditional statements that can be 
tested, and differentiate between science and metaphysics. Wing (1997) pointed-out that 
research in construction management is unique; it deals with humans, systems, 
technology, law and economics.  As such, Wing suggested that the research method 
should be adopted so as to be appropriate to the objectives of the research and the 
particular stage reached since different approaches would serve different functions in the 
knowledge discovery process.   In agreement with Wing, an opinion was presented by 
Raftery et al. (1997) that it would be dangerous to advocate that a certain research 
approach is superior to others.  Instead, they call for a “multi-paradigm” approach to 
construction management research. 
4.4 Research Methods 
Most of the research undertaken in construction management and economics used either 
qualitative or quantitative methods.  Qualitative methods concentrate on exploring the 
nature and origins of people’s views on the issues being studied (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2001) while quantitative methods seek to gather data and to study relationships between 
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facts (Fellows and Liu, 2008).  Positivist research is typically more quantitative as 
positivists typically use research methods such as experiments and statistical surveys, 
while interpretivisits use research methods which rely more on unstructured interviews or 
participant observation and thus may be equated with qualitative research methods. 
In literature, it was noted by Bryman (1984) that the two main philosophical paradigms 
(Positivism and Interpretivism) and research methods (quantitative and qualitative) are 
treated simultaneously and are occasionally confused.  Bryman mentioned that a clear 
symmetry should be made between epistemological positions and associated methods of 
research.  Bryman (1984) concluded that there is no direct relation between methodology 
and research method.  However, it is always important that the right research method is 
used for the research methodology of the study.  Quantitative and qualitative research 
methods should never be thought of as opposites but rather as right tools for performing 
two different kinds of jobs.  Yin (2009) suggests that the determination of the most 
appropriate research style to adopt depends on the type of the research operation.   Table 
 4.2 below shows the two extremes of the research paradigms. 
 Table  4.2: The Characteristics of Research Paradigms 
Variable Extreme 1 Extreme 2 
Ontology Realist Nominalist 
Epistemology Objectivist Subjectivist 
Methodology Positivist Interpretivist 
Method Quantitative Qualitative 
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Mauch and Park (2003) provided the main features of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques as summarized in Table  4.3. 
Table  4.3: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Aims to provide full and accurate 
descriptions of phenomena in all their 
complexity 
Aims to reveal or establish cause-and-effect 
relationships in or among experiences or 
occurrences 
Offers particular value in the process of 
generating new concepts or theories 
Focuses more on the testing of existing 
theories or generalizations  
Relies on deduction Relies on induction 
Attempts to discover and show the 
assumptions that underlie events or actions 
Focuses more on testing the operation of 
assumptions 
Deals mainly with statements and questions 
couched in words and with details of settings 
Deals chiefly with amounts and numbers as 
primary data 
Tends to deal with small samples and 
uniqueness 
Encourages studying large samples and prizes 
representativeness 
Depends on thoroughness and depth of 
reporting to demonstrate significance 
Utilizes statistical analysis, particularly 
employing probabilities, to demonstrate 
significance 
 
According to Carter and Fortune (2004), most of the papers published in the Association 
of Researchers in Construction Management (ARCOM) annual conferences held in 2000 
and 2001 applied quantitative methodologies.  Loosemore et al. (1996) reached a similar 
conclusion as he reviewed the papers published by Construction Management and 
Economics journal between 1983 and 1993.  In their research, Loosemore et al. found 
that 57% of the papers were conducted using quantitative methodology, 8% using 
qualitative methodology, 13% using mixed methodology, and 22% of the papers were 
discussion papers.   
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4.5 Research Strategy 
Table  4.4 shows the five major research strategies (experiments, surveys, archival 
analysis, histories and case studies) developed to determine when to use each research 
strategy (Yin, 2009). The table also shows the three conditions relevant to each research 
strategy as follows: (a) the type of research questions, (b) the degree of control of the 
researcher over actual behaviour or events; and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary 
as opposed to historical events.  
Table  4.4: Matching of Research Question Type and Research Strategy 
 
4.6 Research Questions 
The key research questions in the introductory chapter 1 of this research and issues 
regarding risk in water PPP discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2 and 3) are 
summarized in Table  4.5.  The deductive reasoning column explains the discussion about 
what issues have been resolved and those remaining unresolved.  The research gaps 
column indicates the unresolved issues and the corresponding research actions, which are 
then converted into the research questions in order to arrive to a solution. 
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Table  4.5: Research Questions 
Issues learnt from literature The deductive reasoning Research gaps Research Question(s) 
1- Is PPP suitable for the 
Water sector, given its 
specific risky nature? 
As noted in Chapter 1 and 2, the heated 
debate over water PPP projects between 
opponents and proponents of water 
privatization is far from being settled.  Most 
of the debate has been centered on the 
relative merits of the public and private 
sector in managing large-scale water-supply 
networks.   
Unbiased research is rare; an 
examination of comparative 
performance between public and 
private operation of water assets is 
often influenced by ideological 
commitments.  It is thus somewhat 
predictable that proponents and 
opponents of water privatization rarely 
agree on research strategies of risk 
assessment. 
• How can risk interrelations of 
water PPP projects be 
modelled? 
2- After years of experience, 
are we now able to clearly 
identify the risks associated 
with water projects? 
The following items were noted in Chapter 3:   • What are the water-specific 
risks?  
• Scarcity of Water PPP Studies: Research 
specific to water infrastructure is generally 
rare. Ameyaw and Chan (2015) noted that 
some of the water sector-specific studies are 
relatively dated.  This is particularly 
significant given the large drop in the 
number of water PPP projects post 2008, 
where research work addressing this fact 
was not identified throughout the literature 
review process. 
 
 
• Water-specific studies are rare  
• Water-specific risks are not clearly 
identified in research 
• How to establish benchmarked 
values for risks associated with 
water PPP?   
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Issues learnt from literature The deductive reasoning Research gaps Research Question(s) 
• Generic rather than specific list of risks:  
Cheung and Chan (2011) compared the risk 
factors across transportation, 
water/wastewater, and power PPPs in 
China.  The study concluded that the critical 
risk factors that are frequently encountered 
in water/wastewater projects differ from 
those of the other two infrastructure 
projects.  However, the literature review 
showed that research identification has 
typically adopted a generic set of risks 
without giving consideration to the special 
features of water projects. 
• Risk checklists are typically based on 
subjective opinions obtained during 
workshops with no benchmarked 
values. 
  
In industry, the situation is not any better as 
specifically noted in the case of 
Infrastructure Ontario hiring a consultant for 
generating a general risk matrix to facilitate 
establishing the VFM analysis of future PPP 
Projects (Infrastructure Ontario, Build 
Finance Risk Analysis and Risk Matrix, 
dated 2007).  While this list was meant as a 
starting point, it is still advisable to generate 
sector-specific lists adopting benchmark 
values for an improved risk assessment. 
   
• Subjectivity in risk identification:  In 
research work, most of the risk lists have 
been obtained based on limited survey 
samples.  Most of the conducted studies 
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Issues learnt from literature The deductive reasoning Research gaps Research Question(s) 
addressed China projects because of its 
active role using PPP to develop its water 
infrastructure.  The results of such results 
may not be applicable in other geographical 
areas.  
In Industry, the risk identification exercise 
is based on the input of the technical 
consultant hired to conduct the VFM 
analysis through a risk workshop. This 
makes the analysis highly subjective as 
presented earlier under the “Assessment of 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion & 
Upgrade Project” conducted by the City of 
Regina, Canada.  The use of previous 
experiences to achieve benchmarking values 
of risks across a wider scale of experts is 
necessary for an improved risk assessment. 
    
3- The percentage of 
cancelled projects in Water 
PPP projects is higher in 
comparison to other utility 
sectors. What makes the 
water sector that risky? 
Same like point 2 above  Same like point 2 above • What are the main causes of 
Water PPP Projects’ 
cancellation? 
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Issues learnt from literature The deductive reasoning Research gaps Research Question(s) 
4- Problems with water PPP, 
could it be the methodology 
used for risk evaluation? 
For the assessment of the significance of the 
risks, researchers have gone from fairly 
simple qualitative techniques to 
implementing sophisticated techniques.  
Industry, for clear practical reasons, adopted 
simple qualitative techniques. The 
consideration of advanced semi-quantitative 
techniques may encourage industry to utilize 
the same technique given its practicality for 
application, which would allow for more 
benchmarked data, and in turn improved 
evaluation of risks. 
There is very limited research done in 
developing semi-quantitative 
techniques that may allow researchers 
and industry experts to share their 
experiences. 
• How can the risks associated 
with water PPP project be 
prioritized, through an 
improved risk assessment 
model? 
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4.7 Research Strategy for Each Research Question 
Research Questions 
One and Two 
What are the water-specific risks?  
 What are the main causes of Water PPP Projects’ cancellation? 
Research strategy Archival Analysis 
Rationales 
This is a “What” question to explore the risks associated with water 
PPP, and those risk events that led to the cancellation of previous PPP 
projects.  Current studies are general (i.e. not specific to water), and 
where exist, are generally influenced by ideological commitments. 
As indicated in Table  4.4, the archival analysis is the preferred research 
method.  A literature review was conducted to collect data from 
previous empirical studies and research work in order or explore and 
interpret recognized risk events that affect water PPP projects.  The 
researcher will identify a set of risks affecting water PPP projects 
The research will also study the historical records of water PPP 
cancelled projects. 
Research Question 
Three 
How can risk interrelations of water PPP projects be modelled? 
Research strategy History “Literature Review” 
Rationales 
This is a “How” question to explore an improved model for the 
assessment of water PPP projects.  The researcher aimed to conduct a 
literature review to answer this question. 
A literature review was conducted on PPP risk management, exploring 
how the concept is being adopted, available methods used for risk 
evaluation, in research and industry practice.  The researcher concluded 
that with a good handle of water-specific risks along with adopting 
advanced semi-quantitative risk evaluation techniques, an improved risk 
assessment methodology for the water sector could be developed.  
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Research Questions 
Four and Five  
How can the risks associated with water PPP project be prioritized, 
through an improved risk assessment model? 
 
 How to establish benchmarked values for risks associated with Water 
PPP? 
Research strategy Questionnaire survey with statistical analysis 
Rationales 
These are “How much” questions to measure the phenomenon of 
qualitative risk effects on water PPP projects.  Quantifying qualitative 
risk effects is dependent on the subject belief, perception, experience, 
judgement and predication of the experts who are experienced in the 
selected project cases and practitioners in water PPP projects.  
According to Table  4.4, questionnaire survey is the preferred research 
strategy.  The experts’ opinions are to be collected using the score of a 
Linkert scale 1 to 5 for ranking risks quantitatively. The researcher 
proposes the use of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) for the 
prioritization of the identified risk elements.  The ANP is capable to 
handle the inter-dependency between the identified risk elements, which 
would offer an improved risk assessment methodology.   
A suitable sample of results obtained from the questionnaire would 
assist in establishing benchmarked values, which can be further 
enhanced with the increased use of the model among research and 
industry practitioners.  
4.8 Selected Research Methods 
4.8.1 Questionnaire Survey 
Questionnaire survey was selected as the method of collecting data.  The questionnaire is 
the broadest study, while case study is the deepest study, and interview is between them 
in the context of depth and breadth.  The questionnaire is one of the most frequently used 
methods of data collection in exploration and evaluation research (Propper, 1989; Fellows 
and Liu, 2008; Clarke and Dawson, 1999).  Tiong (1993) mentioned that many objectives 
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have been achieved at PhD thesis level through questionnaire survey. Li (2003) stated 
several advantages for questionnaire survey over other research methods:  
- It is capable of producing large quantities of highly structural data 
- Large access to a lot of people 
- It can be anonymous which make the responses honest 
- Provides the responders with time to response which improved the quality of the 
results 
- Allows for obtaining large answers from responders compared to interviews 
- Eliminates possible bias of the interviewer 
- Less costly compared to other similar methods 
- Reduces the errors that may occur from the variability of the skills of the 
interviewers. 
However, there are some risks associated with questionnaires like the possible lack of 
response and inability to check the responses (Robson, 1993).   
4.8.2 The Analytical Network Process (ANP) 
The review of the different risk analysis methods showed that the use of Analytic 
Network Process (ANP) would overcome the shortcomings observed in typical risk 
analysis methods, since the ANP is capable in handling the inter-dependencies between 
the various risk elements, a feature that is absent in other risk methods.  Besides, it is easy 
to understand and apply, which makes it practical for the use in industry practice. 
The Analytic Network Process is an extension of the Analytic Hierarchical Process 
(AHP), which was proposed by Saaty (1996).  Unlike the AHP, where decision problems 
are formed in hierarchy, in ANP, hierarchical structures are formed as a multi-
dimensional problem, which is arranged in at least three levels: Goal, Criteria, and 
Options. This arrangement exhibits a network structure that showcases different 
relationships in a decision problem. It allows the consideration of the interdependency 
between the various elements in a decision problem,  which in turn allow for a better 
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modelling of complex problems since the majority of real-life problems are non-linear, 
while the feedback link offers a precise determination of the priority of elements and a 
higher quality decision-making (Hsu and Kuo, 2011).   
The Analytic Network Process has its place in the group of multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) methods when an extensive number of factors are involved (Boateng et al., 
2015; Chemweno et al., 2015).  The application of ANP in risks prioritization and 
modelling in megaprojects has been previously presented in Boateng (2014) and Chen et 
al. (2011).  
4.8.2.1 ANP Network Model Construction 
In this step, the water-specific PPP risks are to be structured  to form the ANP model.  As 
Figure  4.1 illustrates, the ANP network model is formed consisting of three clusters: 
‘Goal’, ‘Criteria’, and ‘Options’.  Cluster ‘Goal’ contains only one element, which is 
“Risk Prioritization”. Cluster ‘Criteria’ contains only one element, which is the “Impact 
on Cost” to the project, if the risk occurs. The cluster ‘Options’ contains the potential 
Water-Specific PPP Risk categories and their relevant elements.  A detailed explanation 
of these risk categories considered under the “Options” cluster is discussed in Chapter 5.  
Finally, the outcome of the model showing the prioritization of the Water-Specific PPP 
Risks’ priorities will fall under the “Potential High Risk Ranking”.   
The arrows in the model indicate the relationships between each element in the model, 
which shows how the model allows dependencies in the “Options” cluster showing 
dependencies for both; within each risk category (inner dependence), and between every 
two risk categories (outer dependence) so that elements at each level can be defined 
together with their relationships with other elements in the model (Saaty, 2000; Saaty and 
Vargas, 2012). 
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Figure  4.1: ANP Network Model for Risk Prioritization 
4.8.2.2 Paired Comparisons 
In a subsequent stage, pairwise comparisons between risk categories/elements are 
developed with respect to their relative importance to the Control Criteria: “Impact on 
Cost” to the project, if the risk occurs.  
Typically, the correlation matrices are prepared on a 1-9 ratio scale  to determine the 
relative preferences between every two elements of the hierarchy.  A score of 1 indicates 
that the two elements have equal importance whereas a score of 9 indicates dominance of 
the component under consideration over the comparison component.  
In some cases, for practical reasons, the respondent to the associated questionnaire survey 
is only requested to provide the assessment for the significance of each element with 
respect to the control criteria, instead of seeking the relation between every two risk 
elements with respect to the control criteria.  In such case, the obtained data is 
transformed to reflect the target “Pairwise Comparison” between every two elements in 
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the questionnaire survey.  Such practical approach was followed in this research adopting 
the proposed scale presented in Table  4.6, where the obtained responses to the 
questionnaire survey were included under the “Comparisons of pair indicator scores” and 
resulted in developing the “Scales of pairwise judgement” that were considered in the 
ANP model. 
Table  4.6: Fundamental Scale of Pairwise Judgment and Pair wiser Criteria 
 
The results of each category are established similar to the comparison matrix described in 
Equation (1), where PR is the potential risks and Rij, the comparison between risk 
variables i and j. If activity i has one of the above non-zero numbers assigned to it when 
compared with activity j, then j has the reciprocal value when compared with i. The 
results of the comparisons are represented by dimensionless quotients to measure the 
preference of one element over the other.  
 
Once the pairwise comparison is completed, the vector corresponding to the maximum 
eigenvalue of the constructed matrices is computed and a priority vector is obtained. The 
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priority value of the concerned element is found by normalizing this vector as described 
in equation 2. 
 
By substitution, the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) is calculated to derive a new matrix (W) 
by multiplying comparison matrix (R) with (Wi). Finally, the (λmax) can be obtained by 
averaging the value. Computations of the process are listed in Equation (3) and Equation 
(4) respectively. 
 
The consistency ratio provides a numerical assessment. If the calculated ratio is less than 
0.10, consistency is considered to be satisfactory. The conceptual model is then imported 
into the ANP software, Super Decisions (developed by Adams, W.J. and Satty, R.W.) for 
the pairwise comparison matrices to be solved.  
4.8.2.3 Super Matrix Calculation 
By developing the super matrix, the ANP captures the outcome of dependence and 
feedback within and between the risk categories and elements. 
There are three super-matrices: unweighted super matrix, weighted super matrix and the 
limit super matrix associated with the network.  
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- The unweighted super matrix contains the local priorities derived from the 
pairwise comparison throughout the network.  
- The weighted super matrix is obtained by multiplying all the elements in a 
component of the unweighted super matrix by the corresponding weight.  
- Raising the weighted super matrix to its powers derives the limit super matrix and 
the multiplication process is discontinued when the number becomes the same for 
all columns.  
The three steps aim to form a synthesised super matrix to allow for the resolution of the 
effects of the interdependences that exists between the elements of the ANP model. The 
general form of the super matrix is described below. 
Table  4.7: Formation of Super Matrix and its Sub-Matrix 
 
Where Cn denotes the N
th
 cluster, Nn (1~n) denotes the n
th
 element in the n
th
 cluster, and 
Wij is a block matrix consisting of priority weight vectors (W) of the influence of the 
elements in the ith cluster with respect to the jth cluster. If the ith cluster has no influence to 
the i
th
 cluster itself (a case of inner dependence), Wij becomes zero. The super matrix 
obtained in this step is called the initial super matrix. The eigenvector obtained from 
cluster level comparison with respect to the control criteria is applied to the initial super 
matrix as cluster weight. This result is the weighted matrix. 
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4.8.2.4 Risk Priority Index (RPI) Calculation 
This step aims to calculate the risk priority indices (RPIs) to support final decision- 
making.  Although the RPI can be performed manually with equation 5, it was performed 
using the Super Decisions software in this study. Computation priorities command was 
used to determine the priorities of all the nodes in the network. 
   
Where: 
‘RPIi’ represents the global priority of the risk options i, 
‘W,’ the weight of the criteria j with respect to project cost, time and quality, and 
‘Rij’, the local priority 
After computation, the RPIs can further be classified into five states of likelihood and 
consequence on project cost and assessed as either “very high”, “high”, “moderate”, 
“low” or “very low”. 
- Very High and High Risk Events 
High risk events can be so classified either because they have a very high likelihood of 
occurrence coupled with at least a high impact or they have a high impact with at least 
moderate likelihood. In either case, specific direct management action is warranted to 
reduce the probability of occurrence or the risk’s negative impact. 
- Moderate Risk Events 
Moderate risk events can either be high-likelihood, low consequence events or low- 
likelihood, high-consequence events. An individual high-likelihood, low-consequence 
event by itself would have little impact on project cost.  However, the combined effect of 
numerous high-likelihood, low consequence risks can significantly alter project 
outcomes. 
Commonly, risk management procedures accommodate this high-likelihood, low- 
consequence risks by determining their combined effect and developing cost and/or 
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schedule and quality contingency allowances to manage their influence. Low-likelihood 
and high-consequence events, on the other hand, warrant individualized attention and 
management. At a minimum, low-likelihood and high consequence events should be 
periodically monitored for changes either in their probability of occurrence or in their 
potential impacts. Some events with very large, albeit unlikely, impacts may be actively 
managed to mitigate the negative consequences should the unlikely event occur. 
- Low and Very Low Risk Events 
Risks that are characterized as low and very low can usually be disregarded and 
eliminated from further assessment. As risk is periodically reassessed in the future, these 
low/very low risks are closed, retained, or elevated to a higher risk category. Although, 
there is no standard for estimating risk probability value, the study uses a likelihood 
ratings proposed by Cooper (2005) as shown in Table  4.8. 
Table  4.8: Likelihood Rating 
 
4.9 Summary 
The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, studied water PPP, and risk assessment in water 
PPP, in research as well as in industry practice.  This chapter established the research 
methodology adopted for the research, introducing the systematic approach procedures 
upon which the research is based, the data is collected and interpreted, and the findings 
are evaluated.  
The chapter started by presenting the research paradigms introducing the ontological and 
epistemological extremes and their current application in construction management and 
economics. With respect to research methods, this chapter presented the difference 
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between qualitative and quantitative methods.  In qualitative methods, the concentration 
is in exploring the nature and origins of people’s views on the issues being studied 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2001) wile quantitative methods seek to gather data and to study 
relationships between facts (Fellows and Liu, 2008).  Positivist research is typically more 
quantitative as positivists typically use research methods such as experiments and 
statistical surveys, while interpretivisits use research methods which rely more on 
unstructured interviews or participant observation and thus may be equated with 
qualitative research methods.  
With respect to research strategies, this chapter presented the five main research 
strategies: Experiment, Survey, Archival Analysis, History, and Case study. 
The chapter showed the development of the key research questions through the deductive 
reasoning of the issues noted through literature review, and the noted research gaps and 
the corresponding research actions, which are then converted into the research questions 
in order to arrive at a solution. The chapter presented the selected research strategy for 
each research question.   
The chapter concludes with presenting the selected research methods: Questionnaire 
survey and Analytical Hierarchy Process, which will be utilized as the research methods 
in Chapter 5 and 6, respectively.  
 70 
 
5 CHAPTER 5: WATER–SPECIFIC PPP RISKS 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the presentation of the research methodology in Chapter 4, this chapter 
presents the Water-Specific PPP Risks identified through a broad survey of literature that 
included empirical studies and official publications, covering journal articles, conference 
papers, research reports, text books, commercial or organizational documents, 
governments practice guidance, records, reports, and the like.   
This chapter also presents the setup of the questionnaire survey, the background of the 
respondents, and the analysis of the questionnaire survey results and concludes with 
presenting the mean values of severity for the identified set of risks.  Such results will be 
subsequently used for the development of the ANP network model in Chapter 6. 
5.2 Identification of Risks associated with Water Public-Private 
Partnerships 
The risks associated with water PPP were identified through an extensive literature 
review which included the coverage of available publications including technical papers, 
technical and commercial reports, World Bank water sector reports, press releases and 
relevant news information.  A list of these identified risks, which were presented in an 
earlier publication (Korayem et al., 2015), are summarized in Table  5.1 along with the 
main references in literature, at which these risks were presented and discussed.  A 
detailed description of each of the identified risks is presented in Section  5.3. 
It is worth reminding that the risks elements considered in this research are those directly 
relevant to the Water PPP planning and subsequent operation and maintenance.  Other 
potential common PPP risks covering the social, construction, political aspects of the 
project should also be considered for a successful PPP, however are considered beyond 
the scope of this research.  Such demarcation should be reflected on the developed Water-
Specific PPP Risk Model.  
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Table  5.1: Summary of Water-Specific PPP Risks Identified through Literature Review 
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Absence of maintenance records t, u, v i o                   a1, a7, a9 
Absence of environmental data sampling records t, u, v, d, e f, g, h                     a1, a9 
Uncertainty of value of assets   i n                   a1 
Uncertainty of cost of maintenance   i n                   a2, a7, a9 
Potential increase in served population     k     r             a5, a1 
Potential increase in usage     k                   a2, a6 
Increase in resources to meet environmental 
guidelines 
c   l               
    
a5, a4, a7, 
a3 
Improper planning of interrelated projects         r   r   s p     a1, a4 
Uncontrolled performance of interrelated projects   f, g, h, j                     a5 
Overly complicated commercial model b, x               s       a1 
Tariff structure       r     r   s q, p p 
  
a5, a1, a4, 
a3 
Enforcement of right to water resources                       y  a3 
Significant change in current billing practice     m     r r           a5, a2 
Potential change in currency exchange rates       r r r r r   d p   a1, a2, a3 
Poor communication with stakeholders a           r   s q p   a5, a1, a2 
Potential disruption to current local businesses       r r r r r s        
Underperformance of a local partner             r             
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5.3 Description of Identified Water-Specific Risks 
A description of the water-specific PPP risks identified through the literature review is 
presented under this section. 
5.3.1 Facility Records 
The inadequate utility performance records for years in the past would prevent having 
meaningful comparisons between the public operator and its private successors. In 
Halifax, the disagreements between the public and private parties arose months after the 
initial agreement was signed.  The private party claimed that potential problems with 
influent quality came to light only when the federal government issued its environmental 
screening report for the project. Prior to that, it relied on “out-of-date” data provided by 
the city and by local industry.  The City of Halifax (Canada), insisted that it provided 
ample opportunities for testing and that it would have been reasonable for the consortium 
to do due diligence.    
5.3.2 Asset Condition  
- Uncertainty of Value of Assets 
Obtaining solid information about the state of existing infrastructure (i.e. underground 
pipes) is significant for a proper project evaluation and risk assessment of new 
investments.  A clear identification of the asset condition is a major challenge, where the 
absence of records of existing systems is common. Without such information, it is 
difficult to establish a baseline to enable private firms to accurately bid on the work. 
The most basic valuation problem in valuing assets-in-place is the use of discounted cash 
flow (DCF) techniques (Hertz, 1964).  A common deficiency is that there is no indication 
of the confidence level on the determined capitalization rates (Ye and Tiong, 2000).  
Hertz highlighted the misleading nature of single-point estimates in investment analysis. 
It is important to reflect this uncertainty in model outputs to provide some assurance to 
the decision makers that the available information has been used with maximum 
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efficiency (Hertz, 1964).  The Asian Development Bank guidelines (1999) provide the 
financial evaluation methodologies recommended for water supply projects. 
Absence of previous records has been a typical source of disputes in water PPP.  In the 
case of Atlanta, where some parts of its infrastructure dates back to 1875, the private 
partner “Suez” complained that the initial contract, as it was signed, did not reflect the 
actual status of the system.  The Reason Foundation explained: “Some of the blame must 
fall on UWSA (Public owner). All of the bidders knew about the lack or quality of data 
ahead of time before they bid.  Furthermore, USWA has a lot of experience running old 
systems and it should have built that expertise into its proposal”.  In the case of Buenos 
Aires, the unexpected poor performance of the buried assets was one of the reasons that 
led to the project cancellation at the end.   In the case of Hamilton, the municipal staff 
admitted that for the contractor to meet the required performance standards, the system 
requires investment of hundreds of millions of dollars, which does not form part of the 
contractor scope of work.  
The assessment of infrastructure conditions by competing firms is impractical. Producing 
numerous feasibility studies would push up the costs of the bids and, by making the 
bidding process too expensive for small firms, which would reduce competition.  
- Uncertainty of Cost of Maintenance 
Significant research has been conducted on the rehabilitation of distribution networks.  
The traditional strategies for rehabilitation (Ugarelli, 2008) varies between 1) Operative, 
2) Inspection, Condition based, 3) Proactive; and, 4) Predictive.  Numerous numbers of 
models were developed to assist in developing a rehabilitation strategy that reduces 
leakage, improved operative costs and environmental records.  
Without a solid knowledge of the asset condition, as a result the lack (or incomplete) of 
historical breakage data of the assessment of the operation component becomes very hard, 
and was reported as a major source of dispute. 
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5.3.3 Unsustainable Expansion 
It is essential that the relevant major construction projects, in particular those for water 
production and transmission, are well identified during the preparation stage. An early (or 
late) expansion of the system may cause a disturbance in the overall planning and may 
result in the Contractor’s inability to meet the contract requirements. The following 
factors typically cause the need for facility upgrade and/or expansion: 
- Potential increase in served population 
In Atlanta, the private partner inherited from the city a backlog of between 4,000 and 
7,000 outstanding requests for service.  This was accompanied with a construction boom 
in the service area, which created additional demands that was not accounted for during 
the bidding stage.  Additional investment to meet the increase in demand was not 
envisioned during the bidding process. 
- Potential increase in usage 
In some cases, the improvement of service has resulted in an increase of water usage by 
public while the company may not be prepared for investing on this direction.  In some 
cases, the contract is only set for providing service.  Inability to meet the stakeholders’ 
expectations can draw major negative political implications on the project. In some other 
cases, preventing the use of private wells led to an unexpected increase in usage. 
- Increase in resources to meet environmental guidelines 
The private operator is obliged to follow the performance criteria set in the contract.  This 
may require replacement of inappropriate connections (which is considered as the most 
common source of physical leaks), which in some cases does not form part of the private 
sector scope of work.  Also, it may have not been foreseen as a consequence of years of 
limited or inappropriate data collection.  The timely implementation of such improvement 
has been a key factor in success.  If not considered in the original private sector planning, 
the process may be delayed causing problems in the project delivery.   
In some instances, the involvement of a locally experienced Contractor have helped 
improved the process like in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, SODECI, a governmental entity, 
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has always been in charge of regular extensions of distribution networks which assisted 
when it became responsible for identifying and preparing the capital investment program.  
5.3.4 Impact from Inter-dependent Facilities 
A close coordination between the proposed project objectives and other inter-related 
projects is essential.  Disruption on the program may have negative implications on the 
PPP project, due to one (or more) of the following factors: 
- Improper planning of inter-related projects 
The effect of the delay in awarding (or completing) another relevant project may have a 
severe impact on the project in-hand.  The delay may result in the contractor not being 
able to meet the contract specifications in terms of production or in terms of meeting the 
contract specified environmental regulations.  The case of Manila is the most revealing, 
one of the reasons that led to the cancellation of the project was the government inability 
to complete the relevant river basin project.  In the case of Atlanta, the public partner 
responsibility included flushing of the wastewater system.  The private operator claimed 
that Atlanta did not perform as planned which prevented them from meeting the 
environmental criteria.  Atlanta denied the accusation yet the city auditor confirmed that 
the city had indeed failed to re-invest savings in its utility by charging its water 
department an annual franchise fee, the city had transferred US$9.8 million a year to its 
general fund (Reinhardt, 2003). 
A study conducted by the World Bank advises that the experience in Africa evolved to 
forming the so-called Public Assets-Holding Companies (AHCs).  Mostly have been 
introduced in conjunction with the transformation of a public water supply utility into an 
AHC with the following main functions: (i) act as owner of the water supply assets and 
issue consolidated financial statements of the water operation; (ii) plan, finance, and 
implement major construction projects; (iii) act as owner of the affermage contract; and 
(iv) promote public acceptance of the reform.  However, the delay in implementing 
extension programs by AHCs has caused in some cases major problems to the operator.  
In Guinea, the AHC’s delays in implementing extension programs frustrated the operator, 
who was encouraged to seek financing for implementing its own projects which adversely 
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impacted the operational performance. In Senegal, initial delays in implementing 
rehabilitation programs meant that the AHC had to compensate the operator for loss of 
revenues.  
- Uncontrolled performance of inter-related projects 
In Halifax, Canada, the contract was set so that the city controls what goes into its sewer 
system. The city enforced a sewer-use bylaw to prevent hard-to-treat industrial pollutants 
from contaminating the influent but the city’s regulation of discharges from some 5,000 
sources will only be as effective as the monitoring and enforcement behind it with no 
clear identification in the contract. The latest information on the quality of influent quality 
was due to the inability to control over 5000 sources, which does not form part of the 
contractor’s scope of work. 
5.3.5 Commercial and/or Legal Regulations 
- Overly complicated commercial model 
A suitable commercial model is essential for a successful delivery of the PPP project.  
Experience shows that the transfer of significant financing responsibilities to the private 
partners may create problems.  This was obvious in the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia.  
The private investor, quickly after award, increased supplied water by 30 percent, simply 
through repairs and technical enhancements. However, the concession included operation 
of the existing water supply system and construction within two years of the US $214 
million Misicuni Multipurpose Project (MMP), which used the River Misicuni for 
electricity generation, irrigation and water supply to the city. In order to meet these 
requirements, an average tariff increase of 35% was agreed upon during contractual 
negotiations.  The government committee that negotiated the contract did not appreciate 
the financial implications when it insisted on the construction of the Misicuni dam, a 
project that was not deemed financially viable by the World Bank and international water 
companies. The government also insisted that the private sector sign and execute a 
contract for construction of a treatment plant that the consortium thought expensive and 
unnecessary.  
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In developing countries, the risk is more pronounced, as noticed in failed PPPs in Gambia 
and Chad, where the design of the capital budget was ill-matched with the PPP objectives 
(Fall et al., 2009). In the case of Gambia’s joint power/water operation, 85 percent of the 
revenues were generated from the sale of electricity, but no financing was available for 
rehabilitating and extending the power production and distribution infrastructure, in 
particular to replace a generator that collapsed the day before the operator mobilized (Fall 
et al., 2009).    
The World Bank recommends that the transfer of increased financing responsibilities and 
risks to private partners should be after consultation with key stakeholders and 
performing a detailed analysis of the impact on the customer tariffs and the review of the 
existing financial markets and water supply sector structures (Fall et al., 2009) where the 
following could be investigated: (i) splitting electricity and water operations in countries 
where these services are still provided by combined utilities; (ii) splitting water 
production and distribution in countries where cash generation and the local financial 
markets may not be able to finance major extensions; or where the bulk of financing for 
new infrastructure has been made available to governments by international and bilateral 
financing agencies in foreign currencies. 
- Potential excessive increase in tariff structure 
This may have significant implications on the satisfaction of stakeholders and in turn the 
overall delivery of the project. In the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia, an “Increasing 
Blocking Tariff (IBT)” was issued to ensure that high-income households would pay 
around twice the amount per cubic meter for consumption above 12 m
3
 than that the low-
income users would pay. While the average tariff increase was 35 percent, the actual 
increase varied; lower-income consumers experiences increases of as little as 10 percent 
while higher-income consumers experienced tariff increases as high as 106 percent due to 
the increased tariff for their high level of consumption. 
- Enforcement of right to water resources 
To make the project financially viable in the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia, the private 
sector was granted the exclusive right of water resources in Cochabamba.  As a 
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consequence, many private wells were shut down.  This decision carried significant 
negative political implications.  
- Significant change in current billing practice 
In Africa, billing to public agencies represents 15 to 25 percent of the total billing.  Water 
bills owed by public agencies have been a constant source of conflict between private 
operators and governments. In Côte d’Ivoire, this has been a recurrent problem, solved 
only temporarily by the sector adjustment in the late 1980s. Some countries have 
introduced special arrangements to mitigate the associated financial risk to water utilities 
and protect the revenues. In some countries like Senegal and Niger, an upgrade of the 
internal plumbing of public buildings to limit water consumption has been introduced.   
However, the improvement in billing administration has got several faces.  It may lead to 
a reduction in consumption as a result of water rationing. However, in some cases, the 
opposite may occur, when the greater availability of water lead many consumers to 
increase their consumption, which creates increased water bills not only because of an 
increase in price but also because of an increase in volume.  
- Potential change in currency exchange rates 
Water Projects include considerable fixed assets that are considered irreversible.  This is 
typically accompanied with a potential risk of not fully recovering the billing 
accompanied with potential increase of demand as a result of increase in population, or 
demand.  It is therefore prudent to ensure the commercial scheme has reduced the 
exposure to the risk of increase in exchange rates.  Even in PPP where the investment 
program is financed by the partner government, the operator must still finance operating 
expenses to cover the expatriate staff and imported inputs (chemicals, spare parts, 
hardware, and software).  These costs are in foreign currency, while the operator’s 
revenues are in local currency only. 
Financial problems plagued privatization in Buenos Aires, where a private investor won a 
30-year water and wastewater concession in 1993. The private investor increased water 
coverage, billing collection, operating efficiency.  Although it initially promised to reduce 
tariffs by almost 27 percent, over the years it obtained a number of price adjustments, the 
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first because of the city’s inadequate records and the unexpectedly poor condition of the 
water distribution network. However, the Argentine financial crisis of early 2002 wreaked 
havoc on the concession. The peso was “de-pegged” from the dollar and devalued, the 
private investor had trouble servicing its debt, most of which was denominated in U.S. 
dollars. When the government refused to raise prices to offset the devaluation, the 
consortium announced its desire to pull out of the agreement, and the matter went into 
arbitration (Brubaker 2003). 
Guaranteed foreign exchange rate is typical where the foreign exchange risk is limited as 
the exchange rate to the Euro (or USD) is fixed, and the difference between inflation rates 
can easily be taken care of through a cost index formula.  A study by the World Bank of 
seven African countries in the sample of PPP showed Cape Verde, Ghana, and Guinea—
countries with floating local currencies—have faced a higher foreign exchange risk. In 
Guinea, the risk was mitigated by the external financing of the foreign exchange 
component of the operator tariff, on a declining basis. In Ghana, the management contract 
is financed from external sources and thus protected against foreign exchange risk.  
5.3.6 Mis-management of Stakeholders 
- Poor communication with stakeholders 
The use of PPPs for water supply services always leads to an emotional debate. 
Consulting local stakeholders helps to clarify the objectives of PPPs.  At the design stage, 
several of the PPPs documents have paid particular attention to consulting with 
stakeholders, including various government departments, management and staff of the 
public utility, and the media.   Typical fears include steep tariff increases, massive staff 
reduction, heavy foreign presence, or exclusion of the poor. Expanding the customer base 
has often been a key factor for contracts to achieve financial sustainability.  
In Cochabamba, it was concluded that public officials should have better informed the 
public about the size and rationale for the tariff increase. Only after three months into the 
operation, significant public opposition emerged.  A series of protests against the contract 
and the increase in water tariffs took place. Within weeks, public demonstrations 
prompted the government to roll back the rates and force a refund of the difference paid. 
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The protests continued and escalated to the point that the military was sent into 
Cochabamba to restore calm. In the deteriorating situation, the working personnel 
abandoned their offices and the government cancelled the contract.  
- Potential disruption to current local businesses 
The operator should be closely associated with defining and implementing the 
rehabilitation and extension of distribution networks and with rehabilitating key plants. 
Experience shows that even for PPPs with public funding for investment, operators 
should play a role in implementing civil works.   
The involvement of local private operators managed by nationals typically helps in 
dissipating the perception of foreign involvement in a socially sensitive sector and 
increases the acceptability of the PPP. This was witnessed in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.  
At the opposite extreme, the perception of foreign-managed operator was strong in 
Gambia, Chad, and Mali and was one reason that that led to termination of the contracts 
(Fall et al., 2009).  
In Côte d’Ivoire, the asset capital became public in 1978 and rapidly became one of the 
largest companies quoted at the Abidjan stock exchange. It is owned by hundreds of local 
shareholders and the company’s own staff has been crucial in establishing a sustainable 
partnership between an African government and an African private operator. Shares of 
the private operators in Senegal, Niger, and Gabon are also held by local partners and by 
staff. In these countries local minority shareholders play key roles as active Board 
members. Guinea’s failure to foster local private management at SEEG was largely due to 
the structure of the company’s ownership, with a 49 percent minority share held by the 
government. 
- Under-performance of local partner 
In Chad, the PPP ran into early trouble partly because financing for a new power plant 
had not been secured on time and the construction contracts that were awarded to 
inexperienced contractors for a 350 km pipeline and power plant had to be terminated for 
poor performance (Fall et al., 2009).   
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5.4 Reasons for Cancellation of Water PPP Projects  
A comprehensive literature review of previous experiences was undertaken to obtain a 
better understanding of the main reasons for water PPP projects cancellation.  The 
literature review showed that the special features associated with water infrastructure 
have played a significant role in such high rate of cancellation. The study made by 
Brubaker (2003) was found generally conclusive of the main reasons for projects 
cancellation.  The results of the cases studied by Brubaker are summarized in Table  5.2 
below.  
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Table  5.2: Summary of identified Reasons for Cancellation of Water PPP Projects 
Project 
General issues associated with 
PPP Scheme 
Specific Issues 
Absence of performance baseline data 
Uncertainty of the condition 
of the buried assets 
Health and 
environmental 
regulations 
Hamilton, Canada 
1995 
Rather than engaging in a 
competition, the municipality 
negotiated a sole-sourced 
agreement. 
 
Hamilton enjoyed host of savings 
beyond guaranteed, mostly due to 
staff reductions. 
 
Change in management occurred 
over the contract  
 
A 111-day strike took place against 
the operator's plans to facilitate 
automation 
The contractors' environmental 
performance was difficult to assess after 
decades of inadequate sampling. 
The municipality confirmed 
that the system requires 
hundreds of millions of 
dollars in expansion and 
upgrade, which is Hamilton's 
responsibility. 
Municipal staff pointed-
out that meeting 
performance 
requirements is often 
beyond operator's 
control.   
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
1993 
The government refused to raise 
prices to offset the devaluation of 
the currency 
City inadequate performance results 
(company received price adjustments) 
 Unexpected poor condition of 
the water distribution network 
(company received price 
adjustments) 
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Project 
General issues associated with 
PPP Scheme 
Specific Issues 
Absence of performance baseline data 
Uncertainty of the condition 
of the buried assets 
Health and 
environmental 
regulations 
Cochabamba, Bolivia 
1999 
No competition in bidding 
 
Rise in cost of water lead to strikes 
and mass demonstrations 
      
Halifax, Canada 
2003 
Several management changes in the 
city and the contractor sides lead to 
inability to resolve problems  
Contractor claimed that potential 
problems with influent quality came to 
light only when the federal government 
issued its environmental screening report 
for the project.  Prior to that, it relied on 
out-of-date data provided by the city and 
local industry. 
Control of hard-to-treat 
material to improve the 
quality of influent requires the 
control of 5000 sources, 
which cannot be guaranteed. 
  
Atlanta, USA 2002 
Inherited from the city a backlog of 
outstanding requests for service, 
which the contractor was not able to 
accommodate.  Failure to collect 
outstanding bills.  Change of mayor 
in 2002 led to a change in relation 
between city and water contractor 
  
Atlanta's aging system - some 
parts of it dating back to 1875 
- proved to be in surprisingly 
bad shape. 
 
The city failed to re-invest 
savings in its utility 
A general improvement 
in records except in some 
items. 
Manila, Philippines 
1997 
Refusal to adjust the rates of water 
to enable the contractor to recover 
large foreign exchange losses. 
  
Suffered from the 
government's delay in 
completing a river-basin 
project 
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5.5 Summary of Water-Specific PPP Risks 
This section summarizes the Water-Specific risks presented in Section  5.3.  The risks 
elements and categories considered in this research are those directly relevant to the 
Water PPP planning and subsequent operation and maintenance.  Other potential common 
PPP risks elements covering the social, construction, political aspects should be 
considered for a successful PPP, however are beyond the scope of this research.  Such 
demarcation should be reflected in the developed Water-Specific PPP Risk Model.  
Table  5.3: Summary of identified Water-Specific PPP Risks 
Water-Specific Risk Categories Risk Elements 
Code Category Code Element 
A Facility Records a1 Absence of maintenance records 
a2 Absence of environmental data sampling records 
B Asset Condition b1 Uncertainty of value of assets 
b2 Uncertainty of cost of maintenance 
C Unsustainable Expansion c1 Potential increase in served population 
c2 Potential increase in usage 
c3 Increase in resources to meet environmental guidelines 
D Impact from Interdependent 
Facilities 
d1 Improper planning of interrelated projects 
d2 Uncontrolled performance of interrelated projects 
E Commercial and/or Legal 
Regulations 
e1 Overly complicated commercial model 
e2 Potential excessive increase in tariff structure 
e3 Enforcement of right to water resources 
e4 Significant change in current billing practice 
e5 Potential change in currency exchange rates 
F Mismanagement of 
Stakeholders 
f1 Poor communication with stakeholders 
f2 Potential disruption to current local businesses 
f3 Underperformance of a local partner 
5.6 Questionnaire Survey 
Following the identification of the set of risks associated with Water PPP project, a 
questionnaire survey was issued to investigate the severity of each of the identified risks. 
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The questionnaire survey was posted on-line through professional networks such as 
LinkedIn on 5 October 2015, accompanied with a brief of the research project, and 
requesting industry experts, with previous involvement in Water PPP, to collaborate by 
completing the associated questionnaire survey. A total of fifty-three (53) respondents 
with previous experience in Water PPP (as confirmed in their published professional 
profiles), have provided their responses to the questionnaire survey.  
During the process, some inquiries about the project, or questions about the survey were 
raised by the experts and responded on time.  Professionals with extensive experience 
were e-mailed and invited to take part in this survey. 
 
Figure  5.1: Questionnaire Survey Introductory Page 
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5.6.1 Professional Background of Respondents 
To generate confidence in the credibility of data collected, Table  5.4 provides a summary 
of the descriptive results and the analysis for the questionnaire survey.  The aim of this 
summary was to provide an understanding of the profile and background of the 
respondents.  
Out of the fifty-three respondents, about 65 percent of the respondents have 15 years of 
experience, or more.  The majority of the remaining has 5 to 15 years of experience, with 
only 4 percent of the respondents having less than 5 years’ experience.  This shows that 
the respondents have deep experience in the water industry.  About 64 percent of the 
respondents have worked as technical consultants in water industry, 40 percent of the 
respondents have worked with a private party, and over 35 percent of the respondents 
have worked with the government.  This shows a diversity of the professional background 
between the respondents. 
Over 75 percent of the respondents took part in a water management and operation 
contract.  This would support the view that the respondents are aware of operation and 
maintenance challenges, which was observed during the literature review as a typical 
source of commercial disputes.  A reasonable mix of expertise between traditional 
procurement and PPP models was noted.  The majority of the respondents (43%) have 
worked in Africa.  Almost a quarter of the respondents have worked in either in North 
America, Europe, or in Asia.   This would generally indicate the diversity of the expertise 
of the respondents with respect to geographical areas of professional background.   
This information indicates that he respondents were competent enough and capable of 
participating in the survey. A plausible conclusion therefore is that the respondents are 
sufficiently well vested in water industry. 
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Table  5.4: Professional Background of Respondents 
a) Years of experience b) Previous employers 
 
c) Types of contracts d) Areas of previous expertise 
The respondents were invited to indicate their perception towards the “identified” water-
specific risks.  The respondents were asked to rate the level of risks impact on project cost 
from very low to very high, where 1 represents very low; 2 = low; 3 = average or 
moderate; 4 = High and 5 = very high so that their opinions can be standardized to 
provide a fair idea of what could be the perceived levels of risk impacts on water PPP 
projects.   
5.6.2 Standardized Quantitative Results and Analysis 
To standardize the results gained from each participant of the questionnaire survey, the 
risks were coded, and the outcome was calculated and summarized into a manageable 
form to aid the subsequent Analytical Network Process (ANP) pairwise calculations. 
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Presented in this section are the results of the survey in the order of severity of each of the 
risk group/element.  
 
Table  5.5: Summary of Respondents’ Mean Scores of Risk Significance of Water-
Specific PPP Risk Categories  
Risk Category 
Degree of Severity 
 
Mean 
Value of 
Severity 
Standard 
Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 
 
F: Mismanagement of 
Stakeholders 
2% 9% 19% 28% 42% 
 
3.98 1.07 
E: Commercial and/or Legal 
Regulations 
4% 12% 21% 33% 31% 
 
3.75 1.12 
A: Facility Records 2% 15% 36% 25% 23% 
 
3.51 1.06 
B: Asset Condition 4% 15% 38% 28% 15% 
 
3.36 1.03 
C: Unsustainable Expansion of 
Facility/Utilities 
6% 14% 39% 31% 10% 
 
3.25 1.01 
D: Impact from Interdependent 
Facilities 
8% 19% 31% 29% 13% 
 
3.21 1.13 
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Table  5.6: Summary of Respondents’ Mean Scores of Risk Significance of Water-PPP 
Risk Elements  
 Risk Element 
Degree of Severity   Mean 
Value of 
Severity 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5   
a1: Absence of maintenance 
records 
0% 8% 23% 34% 36% 
 
3.98 0.94 
b2: Uncertainty of cost of 
maintenance 
0% 11% 19% 40% 30% 
 
3.89 0.96 
d1: Improper planning of 
interrelated projects 
2% 8% 27% 31% 33% 
 
3.85 1.03 
f1: Poor communication with 
stakeholders 
6% 2% 21% 46% 25% 
 
3.83 1.01 
d2: Uncontrolled 
performance of interrelated 
projects 
4% 13% 32% 26% 25% 
 
3.55 1.11 
c3: Increase in resources to 
meet environmental 
guidelines 
2% 15% 34% 32% 17% 
 
3.47 1 
a2: Absence of 
environmental data sampling 
records 
8% 13% 25% 38% 17% 
 
3.43 1.14 
f3: Underperformance of a 
local partner 
11% 9% 26% 30% 23%   3.43 1.25 
b1: Uncertainty of value of 
assets 
4% 23% 25% 30% 19%   3.38 1.14 
e1: Overly complicated 
commercial model 
6% 15% 28% 38% 13%   3.38 1.07 
e2: Potential excessive 
increase in tariff structure 
11% 13% 28% 25% 23%   3.34 1.27 
f2: Potential disruption to 
current local businesses 
9% 13% 34% 30% 13%   3.25 1.13 
c1: Potential increase in 
served population 
8% 27% 25% 19% 21%   3.19 1.26 
e3: Enforcement of right to 
water resources 
13% 13% 31% 25% 17%   3.19 1.26 
e5: Potential change in 
currency exchange rates 
21% 6% 33% 13% 27%   3.19 1.44 
c2: Potential increase in 
usage 
8% 26% 28% 17% 21%   3.17 1.24 
e4: Significant change in 
current billing practice 
19% 11% 23% 36% 11%   3.09 1.29 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the water-specific PPP risks, which were identified through an 
extensive literature review.  The identified risks were grouped into six categories, namely, 
Facility Records, Asset Condition, Unsustainable Expansion, Impact from Interdependent 
Facilities, Commercial and/or Legal Regulations, and mismanagement of Stakeholders.  
A further assessment of the main failure cases in the water PPP sector was undertaken 
where the results reinforced the set of identified risks. 
The chapter introduced the setup of the questionnaire survey.  A description of the 
background of the respondents indicated that the respondents were competent enough and 
capable of participating in the survey. A plausible conclusion therefore is that the 
respondents are sufficiently well vested in water industry. 
The chapter concluded with presenting the results of the questionnaire survey where the 
risk categories and elements were listed in order of significance, as seen by the 
respondents to the survey.  This outcome should aid the subsequent Analytical Network 
Process (ANP) pairwise calculations, which will be presented in Chapter 6. 
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6 CHAPTER 6:  INTRODUCING THE “WATER-SPECIFIC PPP 
RISK MODEL” 
6.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the questionnaire survey analysis, presented in Chapter 5, where mean values 
were derived for the severity of the identified risks on water PPP projects’ cost, this 
chapter addresses the development of the substantive ANP model for the prioritization of 
the identified risks.  Pairwise comparison was derived after converting the respondents’ 
scores in order to prioritize risks.  This chapter presents the calculation of the Risk 
Priority Index (RPI) as a project ranking method, with a commentary on the “Very High 
Risks”. 
The chapter presents the “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” with an explanation to the 
reader on how to use it.  Key research achievements are presented within this explanation, 
and are finally followed by a “Validation” of the model, based on the input received from 
key experts. 
6.2 ANP Model Construction (Hierarchic Structure) 
Following the categorization of identified risks (Chapter 5, Section 5.4), a network 
structure was constructed to create influence among the project objective, risk categories 
and elements.  Risk categories: A, B, C, D, E, and F were considered as primary standards 
while sub-variables a1-2, b1-2, c1-3, d1-2, e1-5, and f1-3 were considered as secondary 
standards.  The framework of ANP network process for all risks is shown in Figure 5.1.  
As shown on the figure, there is an outer dependency between the different categories and 
an inner dependency within each member category of risks in the risk prioritization 
structure. Indirect dominance comparison of variables was carried out according to their 
influence on project cost.  
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Figure  6.1: General ANP Network Structure 
 
Table  6.1: Identified Risk Elements associated with Water PPP Projects 
Water-Specific Risk Categories Risk Elements 
Code Category Code Element 
A Facility Records a1 Absence of maintenance records 
a2 Absence of environmental data sampling records 
B Asset Condition b1 Uncertainty of value of assets 
b2 Uncertainty of cost of maintenance 
C Unsustainable Expansion c1 Potential increase in served population 
c2 Potential increase in usage 
c3 Increase in resources to meet environmental 
guidelines 
D Impact from Interdependent 
Facilities 
d1 Improper planning of interrelated projects 
d2 Uncontrolled performance of interrelated projects 
E Commercial and/or Legal 
Regulations 
e1 Overly complicated commercial model 
e2 Potential excessive increase in tariff structure 
e3 Enforcement of right to water resources 
e4 Significant change in current billing practice 
e5 Potential change in currency exchange rates 
F Mismanagement of 
Stakeholders 
f1 Poor communication with stakeholders 
f2 Potential disruption to current local businesses 
f3 Underperformance of a local partner 
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6.3 Establishing the Pairwise Comparison Matrices  
The overall network model was decomposed into sub-network models. These include 
ANP network models for the various risk categories: - A: Facility Records risk category, 
B: Asset Condition risk category, C: Unsustainable Expansion risk category, D: Impact 
from Interdependent Facilities risk category, E: Commercial and/or Legal Regulations 
risk category and F: Mismanagement of Stakeholders risk category.  The sub-network 
models are represented in Figures Figure  6.2-a to -f. 
Figure  6.2: ANP Network Structure 
 
a) A: Facility Records  
 
b) B: Asset Condition  
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c) C: Unsustainable Expansion  
 
d) D: Impact from Interdependent Facilities  
 
e) E: Commercial and/or Legal Regulations  
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f) F: Mismanagement of Stakeholders  
6.4 Pairwise Comparison 
Once the ANP hierarchy is built, its various elements were evaluated systematically and 
compared to one another in pair. In making the comparisons, the rounded mean values 
derived from the questionnaire survey in chapter five were used against the ANP 
fundamental pairwise judgment scale titled “Scales of pairwise judgment” in Table  6.2 
for judgments about the elements’ relative meaning and importance.  
Table  6.2: Fundamental Scale of Pairwise Judgment and Pairwise Criteria 
Scales of pairwise judgment a Comparisons of pair indicator scores b 
1=equal 1:1 
2=equally to moderately dominant 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 5:4, 6:5, 7:6, 8:7, 9:8 
3=moderately dominant 3:1, 4:2, 5:3, 6:4, 7:5, 8:6, 9:7 
4=moderately to strongly dominant 4:1, 5:2, 6:3, 7:4, 8:5, 9:6 
5=strongly dominant 5:1, 6:2, 7:3, 8:4, 9:5 
6=strongly to very strongly dominant 6:1, 7:2, 8:3, 9:4 
7=very strongly dominant 7:1, 8:2, 9:3 
8=very strongly to extremely dominant 8:1, 9:2 
9=Extremely dominant 9:1 
Where: 
a 
Saaty, 1996. 
b
 Scores of indicators used to judge the relative meaning and importance of risk variables 
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The pairwise comparison matrices are then created using equation 1 the element Po(ij) of 
the matrix is the relative importance of the ith criteria with respect to the jth criteria. The 
matrix reciprocal, which is symmetric with respect to diagonal, is the inverse of one 
another. That is: Po(ij) = 1/ Po(ij)., where Po(ij)  is the comparison between item i and j. 
Item i, j =1, 2…n. 
 
    
   
 (1) 
 
    
 
The values are inserted into the multi-criteria decision software called the Super Decision 
as shown on Table  6.3. 
 99 
 
Table  6.3: Pairwise Comparison Data 
 
Risk 
Element* 
a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2 c3 d1 c2 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 f1 f2 f3 
a1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
a2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
b1 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
b2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
c1 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
c2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
c3 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
d1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
d2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
e1 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
e2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
e3 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
e4 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
e5 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
f1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
f2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
f3 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 
Notes: *: Refer to Table  6.1 
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6.5 Consistency test 
The Consistency Ratio (CR) is a widely used consistency test method in both AHP and 
ANP. The CR is used to check the consistencies of the values obtained according to the 
pairwise comparison. In the ANP method, survey participants and decision makers or 
experts who make judgments or preferences must go through the consistency test. 
Reasons are because the final risk assessment and decision analysis could be inaccurate if 
the priority values are calculated from the inconsistent comparison matrix. Therefore, the 
consistency of each comparison matrix has to be tested before the comparison matrices 
are used to assess risk and analyze a decision. If the consistency test for the comparison 
matrix failed, the inconsistent elements in the comparison matrix have to be identified and 
revised; otherwise, the result of risk assessment and decision analysis would be 
unreliable.  To determine the consistency of respondents’ judgment on the risks impacts, 
a consistency ratio (CR) of the comparison matrices is calculated using the process in 
Figure  6.3. 
Figure  6.3: Calculation Process for the CR Method 
λmax
 
Step 1: Calculate the maximum eigenvalue  of one comparison matrix.  
Step 2: Calculate the value of Consistency Index (CI)  
Step 3: Calculate the CR using the formula  and  
Table  6.4. 
Step 4: Compare the value of CR with the consistency threshold 0.1 to judge whether the 
comparison is consistent. 
 
Step 1: Calculate the maximum eigenvalue  of one comparison matrix.  
After a comparison matrix has been formed, the normalized priority of the element can be 
compared by the computation of eigenvalue and eigenvectors with the Equation 2. 
   (2) 
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Where  A is the matrix of pair-wise comparison, 
 w is the eigenvector, and 
 is the maximum eigenvalue of [A] 
By substitution, the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) is calculated to derive a new matrix (W) 
by multiplying comparison matrix (A) with (wi). Finally, the (λmax) can be obtained by 
averaging the value. Computations of the process are listed in Equation (3) and Equation 
(4) respectively. 
    (3) 
 
               (4) 
Step 2: Calculating the value of CI  
In order to determine the consistencies of respondents’ judgments, the consistency ratios 
(C.R.) of the comparison matrices are calculated using the formula: 
         (5) 
Where CI  = Consistency ratio 
   = Maximum eigenvalue 
  n = Order of matrix [A]. 
If C.I. = 0, means respondents’ judgments satisfy the consistency. 
If C.I. > 0, means the experts have conflicting judgments. 
If C.I. ≤ 0.1, means there is reasonable level of consistency. 
 
Step 3: Calculating the Consistency Ratio (CR)  
CR is the most widely used consistency index when conducting traditional consistency 
test. Based on matrix size, the CR can be calculated using the formula: 
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        (6) 
Where R.I. is a random index as shown in  
Table  6.4 
 
When C.R. ≤ 0.1, it means the evaluation process satisfies the consistency 
 
Table  6.4: The Average random Index 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 1.59 
 
Step 4: Judging the consistency  
The comparison is checked for consistency by comparing the CR value with the 
consistency threshold of 0.1.  If CR ≤ 0, it means respondents’ judgments satisfy the 
consistency. If not, then that means the experts have conflicting judgments. The 
inconsistent elements in the comparison matrix have to be identified and revised; 
otherwise, the result of risk assessment and decision analysis is unreliable. If CR ≤ 0.1, 
means there is reasonable level of consistency. 
6.6 The Super Matrix Calculation 
After completing the pairwise comparisons, the next step is to build the supermatrix.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the supermatrices are computed in three steps.  In the first step, 
the unweighted supermatrix is created directly from all local priorities of the potential 
risks as indicated in Table  6.5.  In the second step, the weighted supermatrix (see Table 
 6.6) is calculated by weighing the local priority indices or the unweighted supermatrix 
with their affiliated priorities for project cost.  
Finally, the weighted supermatrix is raised to limiting power in order to converge and to 
obtain a stable set of weights that represents the final priority vector.  Stabilization is 
achieved when all columns in the supermatrix corresponding to any node have the same 
values as show in Table  6.7. 
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Table  6.5: Unweighted Super Matrix for Risk Elements associated with Water PPP Projects 
 
Risk* a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2 c3 d1 d2 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 f1 f2 f3 Cost 
a1 0.000 0.111 0.111 0.105 0.105 0.100 0.105 0.105 0.111 0.100 0.105 0.000 0.100 0.100 0.105 0.118 0.111 0.095 
a2 0.056 0.000 0.056 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.056 0.048 
b1 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.125 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
b2 0.111 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.100 0.105 0.105 0.111 0.100 0.105 0.000 0.100 0.100 0.105 0.118 0.111 0.095 
c1 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
c2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.000 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
c3 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.000 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
d1 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.105 0.105 0.100 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.105 0.125 0.100 0.100 0.105 0.118 0.111 0.095 
d2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
e1 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
e2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.000 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.056 0.048 
e3 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.000 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.048 
e4 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.000 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.000 0.050 
e5 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.000 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.048 
f1 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.105 0.105 0.100 0.105 0.105 0.111 0.100 0.105 0.125 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.118 0.111 0.092 
f2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.056 0.048 
f3 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.000 0.048 
Cost 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Notes: *: Refer to Table  6.1 
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Table  6.6: Weighted Super Matrix for Risk Elements associated with Water PPP Projects 
Risk *  a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2 c3 d1 d2 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 f1 f2 f3 Cost 
a1 0.000 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.095 
a2 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.028 0.048 
b1 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.063 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
b2 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.095 
c1 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
c2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
c3 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.000 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
d1 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.059 0.056 0.095 
d2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
e1 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
e2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.000 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.028 0.048 
e3 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.000 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.048 
e4 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.000 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.000 0.050 
e5 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.000 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.048 
f1 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.059 0.056 0.092 
f2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.028 0.048 
f3 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.000 0.048 
Cost 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 
Notes: *: Refer to Table  6.1 
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Table  6.7: Limiting Super Matrix for Risk Elements associated with Water PPP Projects 
 
 Risk * a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2 c3 d1 d2 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 f1 f2 f3 Cost 
a1 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 
a2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
b1 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
b2 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
c1 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
c2 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
c3 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
d1 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 
d2 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
e1 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 
e2 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 
e3 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
e4 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
e5 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
f1 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
f2 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
f3 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Cost 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 
Notes: *: Refer to Table  6.1 
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The results of the ANP priorities are demonstrated in Table  6.8 below. 
Table  6.8: Results of ANP Priorities for Risks  
Associated with Water PPP Projects 
Risk Element * TRPI IRPI Rank 
a1 0.06 0.99 3 
a2 0.03 0.48 16 
b1 0.03 0.52 10 
b2 0.06 0.96 4 
c1 0.03 0.52 8 
c2 0.03 0.52 5 
c3 0.03 0.52 9 
d1 0.06 0.99 2 
d2 0.03 0.52 12 
e1 0.03 0.51 14 
e2 0.03 0.51 15 
e3 0.03 0.44 17 
e4 0.03 0.52 7 
e5 0.03 0.52 6 
f1 0.06 1.00 1 
f2 0.03 0.52 13 
f3 0.03     0.52 11 
Notes: *: Refer to Table  6.1 
Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority Index, IRP1 = Ideal Risk priority Index 
The globalized priorities under each risk element is equivalent to the total risk priority 
index (TRPI), which can be expressed in ideal forms known as Ideal Risk Priority Indices 
(IRPIs) by dividing each TRPI by the largest value.  For example, the IRPI for potential 
risk b2 will be as follows: 
IRPIb2  =  TRPIb2 / TRPImax 
That is IRPIb2 = 0.03 / 0.06  
 = 0.52 (in approximation) 
Where IRPIb2 is the Ideal Risk Priority Index for risk element “b2” with a value of 0.52; 
TRPIb2 is the Total Risk Priority Index for b2 (0.03) while TRPImax representing the 
maximum value (0.06) among the Total Risk Priority Indices for the risk elements.  The 
effect of this normalization is to make the maximum potential risk the ideal one with 
others in proportionate value.  To demonstrate, a decision maker may then interpret the 
results to mean that impacts of risk on Water PPP for elements a2, b1, b2 to be as 48%, 
52%, and 96% respectively as risky as that of f1. 
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6.7 Risk Ratings Mode 
At this stage, potential risks were evaluated by selecting the appropriate “verbal” rating 
category on their level of impacts on Water PPP as Very high (5), High (4), Medium or 
Moderate (3), Low (2) and Very low (1). The idealized priorities (IRPI) calculated in 
Table  6.8 are used for risks rating.  For example, a priority value greater than 0.62 is 
classified as having a very high risk impact on the project objectives and so on. The rating 
categories for the five scales are established in Table  6.9.  
Table  6.9: ANP Model Input Data 
 
Risk rating for 
Water PPP 
Projects 
  VH H M L VL 
Normalized 
Priorities 
Idealized 
Priorities 
Numerical 
Risks 
Rating (%) 
Very High VH 1 2 3 4 5 0.42 1.00 >62 
High H 1/2 1 2 3 4 0.26 0.62 38-61 
Moderate M 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 0.16 0.38 24-37 
Low L 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 0.10 0.24 14-23 
Very Low VL 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 0.06 0.14 <14 
Total priorities             1.00     
6.8 Risk Priority Index (RPI) as a Project Ranking Method of all Risks 
The developed Idealized Risk Priority Indices (IRPIs) can be used to prioritize Water PPP 
projects from a risk prospective. The higher the IRPI, the higher the rank of the risks 
associated with Water PPP. 
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Table  6.10: Prioritization of Water-Specific PPP Risks 
Risk Element Ranking IRPI % 
Verbal 
Rating 
f1: Poor communication with stakeholders 1 100% Very High 
d1: Improper planning of interrelated projects 2 99% Very High 
a1: Absence of maintenance records 3 99% Very High 
b2: Uncertainty of cost of maintenance 4 96% Very High 
c2: Potential increase in usage 5 52% High 
e5: Potential change in currency exchange rates 6 52% High 
e4: Significant change in current billing practice 7 52% High 
c1: Potential increase in served population 8 52% High 
c3: Increase in resources to meet environmental 
guidelines 
9 52% High 
b1: Unc rtainty of value of assets 10 52% High 
f3: Underperformance of a local partner 11 52% High 
d2: Uncontrolled performance of interrelated projects 12 52% High 
f2: Potential disruption to current local businesses 13 52% High 
e1: Overly complicated commercial model 14 51% High 
e2: Potential excessive increase in tariff structure 15 51% High 
a2: Absence of environmental data sampling records 16 48% High 
e3: Enforcement of right to water resources 17 44% High 
6.9 Commentary on Risk Prioritization Results 
Since the risks have been described in details in Section  5.3, presented herein briefly the 
top four risks, identified in the survey results as being “Very High” risks. 
f1: Poor communication with stakeholders: The use of PPPs for water supply services 
always leads to an emotional debate. It is therefore very essential to maintain a close and 
transparent relationship with all stakeholders, which is not limited to end users, but also 
government departments, management and staff of the public utility, and the media.   The 
typical fears include steep tariff increases, massive staff reduction, heavy foreign 
presence, or exclusion of the poor. Expanding the customer base has often been a key 
factor for contracts to achieve financial sustainability.  
d1: Improper planning of inter-related projects: Poor planning of other related 
projects can have a severe impact on new projects.  The delay of inter-related project(s) 
may result in the contractor not being able to meet the contract specifications in terms of 
production or environmental regulations.   
a1: Absence of maintenance records: Inadequate utility performance records for years 
in the past could prevent making meaningful comparisons between the public operator 
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and its private successors. This was one of the key findings of the research, which proved 
to be hurting the successful progression of several new Water PPP projects.    
b2: Uncertainty of cost of maintenance: Significant research has been conducted on the 
rehabilitation of distribution networks.  Numerous models were developed to assist in 
developing rehabilitation strategies that reduces leakage, improved operative costs and 
environmental records. However, the absence of sufficient records and the non-uniformity 
of the water facilities construction and maintenance pose challenges on estimating the 
cost of maintenance, especially during the early bidding stage.  
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6.10 The “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” 
 
Figure  6.4: The “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” 
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6.10.1 How to use the model? 
- Step #1: Establish the Project Context & Identify the Risk Assessment 
Project Team (White in the model) 
The model is mainly designed to support the “Value-for-Money” analysis, where 
an estimate of the value of risk is required to assist in developing the associated 
financial model; named “Adjusted Shadow Bid (ASB)” estimating the total 
project cost if the project is delivered using private sector or Public-Private 
Partnership.  As such, the project manager should carefully establish the project 
context; identify the risk assessment team who are directly involved in the water 
sector industry, and preferably aware of the project context.  Inviting team 
members who are from the same country (or region) is advisable as it ensures the 
individual’s awareness of the culture and governing laws.  
- Step #2: Risk Identification (Yellow in the model) 
The model has benefited from the extensive literature review undertaken in this 
research, which was concluded with suggesting six water-specific PPP risk 
categories with underlying sub-risks.  This would overcome the drawback noted, 
in research works as well as in industry, where risk assessments is generally based 
on generic sets of PPP risks with no consideration of the special nature of water 
projects. 
The use of these risk categories would reduce the exposure to unforeseen project 
conditions.  However, it is important to note that the identified set of risks should 
not be considered as an exhaustive list.  It would however offer a systematic 
approach for considering additional risks that may be considered applicable by the 
risk assessment team. 
- Step #3: Risk Prioritization (Blue in the model) 
The model has benefited from the extensive literature review undertaken in this 
research with respect to risk prioritization.  The review of the different methods of 
risk analysis suggested that the use of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) would 
overcome the shortcomings observed in other typical risk analysis methods.  This 
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is attributed to the ANP capability to take into consideration the interdependency 
amongst the identified project risks as oppose to other methods, which in turn 
would lead to an improved modelling of the identified risks.  Besides, the ANP 
technique is relatively easy to understand and therefore can be easily implemented 
in industry practice.  
- Step #4: Risk Comparison (Orange in the model) 
In typical industry practice, the risk assessment team is formed of a limited 
number of industry experts representing the various stakeholders.  This model 
allows for the opportunity of recognizing previous risk assessments as it offers the 
priority risk indices, collected from the survey from over fifty industry experts.  
These values could be used as “benchmarked” values for risk priorities.  
Such comparison with benchmarked values is considered to be unique in this 
model, and offers a way forward for an improvement in risk assessment if the 
outcome of future risk assessment sessions is consistently being shared and 
included in the model as priority benchmarked values.  The results of previous 
sessions can be further grouped by country, region, type of project…etc.   
Obviously, each project would carry its specific unique characteristics and 
therefore any comparison with the model risks’ benchmarks values should be 
taken with caution.  As shown in the model, if the risk assessment team is 
comfortable with the comparison results, they can move to the next step of risk 
treatment otherwise a re-assessment of the identified risks and associated priorities 
should be considered. 
- Step #5: Risk Treatment (Pink in the model) 
Looking back at earlier stages, we can see that the risks have been identified 
(Stage 2), and Prioritized (Stage 3), then refined by comparison to benchmark 
values (Stage 4).   The outcome could be considered as a list of risks that have 
been under a qualitative assessment, which qualifies per the Project Management 
Practice (discussed in details in Section  3.2), to proceed with the subsequent stage 
of “Risk Treatment”. In this stage, the risk assessment team should consider 
methods like risk reduction, avoidance, retention, and risk transfer.  With respect 
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to risk allocation, it should be ensured that the side that owns the risk (public or 
private) is the party that is best to manage it.     
- Step #6: Calculating the Value-for-Money (VFM) (Green in the model) 
The estimated cost of the water-specific risks together with the estimated cost of 
“Other” PPP risks would lead to estimating the “Adjusted Shadow Bid (ASB)”, 
which is the cost estimate if the project is delivered using private sector or Public-
Private Partnership.  As explained earlier in Section  3.5.2, the Value-Money-
Analysis can be estimated from the below equation: 
Traditional Project Cost under PSC – Project Cost under ASB 
Traditional Project Cost under PSC 
Where the “Public Sector Comparator (PSC)” is developed by estimating the total 
project cost if the project is delivered by public sector. 
- Step #7: Negotiation (Grey in the model) 
In case the estimated VFM is not acceptable by the Public Sector, a cycle (or 
more) of negotiation can take place.  The negotiation would include an adjustment 
to risk allocation, and a compensation for some of the risks undertaken by the 
private sector.  The outcome of this stage should be fed back to the model for re-
evaluation of the cost of risks until the VFM becomes satisfactory. 
- Step #8: Go PPP 
An acceptable VFM is an indication of a feasible PPP project. 
6.11 Data Validation 
Validation is the task of demonstrating that the model has reasonably addressed the 
research project aim.  In absence of real data that can examine the practical use of the 
model, the validation attempts concentrated in examining the experts’ intuitions.   
Essentially, using expert intuition to validate a model requires a careful selection of the 
validation team, who owns the technical and practical knowledge in the field of Water 
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PPP.  The criteria developed for the selection of the members of the “Validation Team” 
included the following: 
• The member should have not been involved in the earlier survey work 
conducted as part of this research for risk prioritization  
• The member should have a minimum of 15 years’ experience 
• The overall validation members’ experiences should be spread across various 
roles (Owner, Contractor, Operator,…etc.) 
• The overall validation members’ experiences should be spread across various 
geographical areas 
After investigating a number of professional profiles, an opinion was mode to select five 
team members, whose profiles were found to be meeting the selection criteria, and noted 
as the “Validation Team”.   
The aim of the validation process was set to evaluate the usefulness of the model, the 
identified water-specific risks, and the opinion on the developed risk model, which was 
formulated into the following “Research Validation Questions”: 
1. After reading the research background and based on your experience, how do you 
see the need for the development of the “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model”? 
2. How do you evaluate the “Water-Specific” PPP risks identified under this 
research? 
3. What is your opinion of the “Water-specific PPP Risk Model” developed under 
this research? 
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Below are the responses received from the “Validation Team” on each of the “Research 
Validation Questions”: 
Question 1: After reading the research background and based on your experience, 
how do you see the need for the development of the “Water-Specific PPP Risk 
Model”? 
Respondent 1 
Very relevant, considering the risk perception by investors. The Water 
sector is seen as a very sensitive and risky sector, and investors and PPP 
proponents will need to appreciate sector-specific risks. 
Respondent 2 
Water related PPP wholly depend on professionalism of host government 
(ability to clearly communicate requirements for a project, ensure 
enforceability of legal structures, ensure access to 
capital/guarantees…etc.) thus such models have got to be country-
specific. 
Respondent 3 
Looking to the need of investment in the water sector, it is greatly needed 
to have a water specific PPP model. 
Respondent 4 
As a quality management professional with extensive experience in 
potable water production I found your research interesting 
Respondent 5 Very much needed.  Can be implemented as a commercial software. 
Question 2: How do you evaluate the “Water-Specific” PPP risks identified under 
this research? 
Respondent 1 
The risks are critical but not unique to the water sector. The risks that 
have been identified cut across all infrastructure sectors.  Filtering out the 
risks of utmost importance for the water sector is valuable. 
Respondent 2 
Use standard risk valuation practices (probabilities/impacts) relevant for 
particular PPP 
Respondent 3 The identified risks are quit realistic. 
Respondent 4 
Personal experience confirms much of what you report. The top survey 
result is particularly interesting. The only observation I can add to that 
finding is confusion over whether poor stakeholder communication is a 
feature or flaw in the average project. Either way much of any given 
project's overall performance can be linked to that single root cause. 
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Respondent 5 
Better value to add risk mitigation measures. 
We assumed that based on those risks to give advice to Owner of assets 
what to do. Do you go on a concession or to make changes before PPP 
tender opening? i.e. to change legislation or financial model or whatever 
needed? 
Question 3: What is your opinion of the “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” 
developed under this research? 
Respondent 1 
The risk model looks very interesting.   It will come in handy for business 
case development for Water PPPs.  
Respondent 2 Plausible, but... devil is in the details. 
Respondent 3 The risk model has covered most of the aspects comprehensively. 
Respondent 4 Valuable. 
Respondent 5 
Risk model Is OK. I will appreciate if you can divide in the model the 
three main RISKS (with three sub-programmes): 
• Technical risk 
• Legal Risk 
• Economical risk 
6.11.1 Review of Comments made by the “Validation Team”  
The outcome of the validation confirms the usefulness of the risk model, particularly the 
need for such model in industry practice. Naturally; the group has raised a number of 
remarks, which are consolidated under this section, with the researcher’s response to each 
of the remarks.  
1. The model should be country-specific. 
The researcher is in agreement with this remark.  The risks associated with 
construction in general, and PPP in particular, is heavily reliant on the social, 
economic, and political conditions of the country in question.  Roumboutsos and 
Anagnostopoulos (2008) have particularly addressed this topic by comparing risk 
allocation in the Greek PPP sector to the far more-advanced UK PPP sector, where 
they identified the difference in risk perception between the two markets.  However, 
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they concluded that such difference in risk perception is not only attributed to the 
maturity of UK the market over the Greek market, but also due to the different 
conditions between both countries. 
In our research, extensive efforts were made to limit the model, and its associated 
survey, to certain countries, or geographical areas of similar conditions. A proposal 
was made to several major public and private entities with a request to engage their 
staff in responding to the survey.  Unfortunately, such request was not accommodated 
by the approached entities for confidentiality reasons.  Perhaps, the development of a 
“Country-Specific” “Water-Specific” PPP Risk Model will be more feasible in future, 
when the results of this research are published. 
2. The identified risks are not specific to the water sector. 
The identified risks were established based on an extensive review of water-specific 
PPP risks as demonstrated in this research, particularly Chapter 4, Section 4.6/7 and 
Chapter 5.  A closer look at the identified risks in Table  5.1 and Table  5.3 would 
support the same.  It is natural that some of the identified risks are common with other 
infrastructure sectors procured under the PPP scheme.  Perhaps further emphasis to 
readers about the development of water-specific risks is required, with no necessary 
change to the current risk model. 
3. Model should adopt traditional risk valuation practices (probability/impacts) 
The researcher considered the practicality of the proposed model and approach.  The 
literature review included a detailed investigation of the industry practice (Section 
3.5.2). This comment refers to the “qualitative assessment” carried-out as part of the 
Value-for-Money (VFM) analysis, however, it should be noted that The “Water-
Specific PPP Risk Model” is not intended to replace the VFM analysis, but rather to 
support it, since the VFM analysis would have a more general assessment of the 
project risks that goes beyond the scope of the model.  Accordingly, the normal 
valuation practices adopted in VFM analysis remains untouched.  
The value of the Water-Specific PPP Risk Model is its capability to imitate the human 
mind conception of interdependency between the risk factors through the Analytic 
Network Process, which would offer an improved decision making process.  In the 
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future, the model would also be able to increase the reliability of the results through 
the establishment of benchmark risk values from previous projects.  
The extent of the Water-Specific PPP Model in relation to the VFM analysis is clearly 
noted in the model. 
4. Add risk mitigation measures to the model. 
In line with risk management risk practices, the model has considered an overall 
strategy that includes risk identification, analysis, and treatment.  Presenting specific 
risk mitigation measure for each specific risk was beyond the scope of this research. 
5. Advice to owner about suitable procurement model, as an outcome of the 
model. 
The model can be used for the assessment of several procurement models. This would 
require the assessor(s) to follow the model, for each proposed procurement model as 
part of the “Strategic Assessment” stage that precedes the Value-for-Money (VFM) 
analysis.  Typically, and as noted under Section 3.5.2, the aim of the “Strategic 
Assessment” stage is to develop a risk profile of all models under consideration, not 
only PPP models.  For example, the “Design-Bid-Build (DBO)” would be assessed, 
beside other potential PPP models like “Design-Bid-Finance-Operate (DBFO)”, 
“Design-Bid-Operate (DBO)” …etc. 
For the purpose of this research, a “generic” PPP model was assumed.  The 
consideration of several PPP models would have extensively increased the number of 
survey questions, which would have hindered the progress of this research.  
6. Split risks into technical, legal, and economical risks. 
As part of the literature review, the various classifications of risks were studied, as 
noted under Section 3.4.  The model was developed with special focus on water-
specific risks.  Hence, it was considered to establish risk groups unique to this sector 
like facility records, Asset condition, Unsustainable expansion, …etc. (Refer to Table 
5.2 for the full list). 
The proposed classification of risks is more applicable to the Value-For-Money 
analysis, which comes at a final stage, considering the overall risks, as opposed to the 
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water-specific risks and categories considered under the “Water-Specific PPP Risk 
Model”. 
6.12 Summary 
This section of the study proposes the use of ANP methodology to prioritize risks in 
water PPP projects.  Risk sources were identified in literature, through source documents 
of past and experts’ opinions, and accordingly were categorized into risk categories. A 
model for calculating Risk Priority Indices (RPIs) was designed and its components were 
explained and discussed in details throughout this chapter. The developed models were 
applied to six risk categories, and its sub-set elements, to evaluate their level of impacts 
on project cost. 
Prioritization results revealed that poor communication with stakeholders, improper 
planning of interrelated projects, absence of maintenance records, and uncertainty of cost 
of maintenance have the highest average score in the hierarchy risks elements considered 
in this research.  A brief discussion of each of the high risks was presented. 
The relevancies of this chapter are that: 
• It provides practitioners with a tool to evaluate and prioritize risks impact levels in 
new water PPP Projects; and,  
• Provides researchers with risk areas and sub-areas, model to evaluate and 
prioritize risks and a methodology to quantify the qualitative effects of risk 
elements considering the inter-dependency between such risks.   
This chapter presented the final outcome of the research, represented in the “Water- 
Specific PPP Risk Model”.  The model offers a suitable platform for addressing the risks 
associated with Water PPP Projects.  Throughout the eight steps, suggested by the 
Author, the model is capable of deriving a reasonable level of confidence an estimated 
Value-for-Money, which is key in awarding a project under the PPP scheme.  The model 
is unique in addressing special aspects: 
• Recognizes the special nature of the Water Sector through the careful 
consideration of the Water-Specific risks. 
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• Utilizes the extensive study undertaken in this research by considering the 
identified Water-Specific PPP risks.   
• Considers the value of past experience by offering benchmark priority preferences 
of risk identified in this research, which can be further expanded as more results 
become available. 
• Considers the interdependency between the various risk elements through the 
suggestion of using of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) method. 
• Offers an improvement towards bridging the gap between the academic and the 
practical approach to risk management: The model is easy to understand and use, 
which would encourage practitioners to apply it in their projects 
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7 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The literature review showed an intense debate over the involvement of the private sector 
in water infrastructure.  This is accompanied with a severe drop in the number of Water 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) projects since year 2008, and a higher cancellation rate 
of water PPP projects in comparison to other infrastructure sectors.  Based on the 
outcome of the literature review, the research questions were developed (Chapter 4, 
Section 4.5) and the research aim and objectives were formulated (Chapter 1, Section 
1.4).   Figure 1 below presents the research process introducing the research questions, 
aim, and objectives, leading to the development of the research plan (Chapter 1, Fig. 1.3). 
 
Figure  7.1: Research Process 
The proposed research idea was reported to the research community (Korayem and 
Ogunlana, 2013).  Professionals working in the water sector were consulted about the 
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novelty of the research point and its benefit to the industry.  The responses were positive 
and supportive of the research aim.  Below are some excerpts of the professionals’ 
comments: 
- “You are doing a valuable work, all the best” 
- “The study is useful for decision maker” 
- “This would be a very useful research to give advice to decision makers” 
- “…. We are busy looking at P3 developments with construction of dams.  
Would very much be interested in any info, that you assist and vice versa” 
- “Would be very interested to participate on this” 
-  “…. I am currently working on an assignment of the ADB to develop 
investment guarantees for the WSS in Africa and would like to participate 
and contribute” 
The six chapters presented so far have elucidated the literary, conceptual, methodological 
and substantive approach adopted in addressing the research agenda.  In this chapter, the 
research is brought to a close by summarizing the issues addressed throughout the study.  
A summary of how the key research objectives were satisfied is presented followed by the 
main conclusions of the research.  Finally, the thesis is brought to closure with 
recommendations for future research. 
7.2 Review of Research Objectives 
Objective One: To identify and describe the significant risks associated with water PPP 
Projects with respect to cost and analyse the main reasons for projects’ cancelation. 
- The risk identification commenced with a broad survey of literature that included 
current empirical studies and official publications, covering journal articles, 
conference papers, research reports, textbooks, commercial or organizational 
documents, governments practice guidance, records, reports, and the like. 
- The literature review showed the specific nature of water infrastructure in 
comparison to other infrastructure sectors. Specifically, the irreversible nature of 
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its capital investment, the natural monopoly and the sensitive health and safety 
regulations associated with this sector (Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  The literature 
review showed that such special nature of the sector was typically overlooked in 
the assessment of Water PPP projects, whether in research work or in industry 
practices (Chapter 3, Section 3.6). 
- The critical literature review of the arguments of opponents and proponents of 
private sector involvement in the water sector facilitated a better understanding of 
the nature of this sector and in turn its risks (Chapter 2, Section  2.5.1).  As an 
example, assuming that the private investor would endeavour to increase the 
usage of water network, or to consider lowering the prices so as to generate more 
revenue is not always valid as such increase will be accompanied with an 
increase in usage, which will be associated with an increased maintenance cost.  
- A detailed review of the Value-for-Money analysis of a PPP project was 
undertaken.  The risks identified in the case study were assessed (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5.2).   The critical review confirmed the need for a risk model specific 
to water PPP (Chapter 3, Section 3.6). 
- The high cancellation rate of water PPP projects in comparison to other projects 
was generally overlooked in previous research work.  To overcome this research 
gap, it was prudent to investigate the reasons behind project cancellation (Chapter 
5, Section 5.3).  Factors like the absence of performance baseline data, 
uncertainty of the condition of buried assets, and the potential “more” stringent 
health and environmental requirements were identified as the main reasons that 
historically led to the cancellation of Water PPP projects.  
- The literature review of water maintenance and rehabilitation strategies showed a 
typical constraint of a fixed limited budget for maintenance accompanied with the 
need to maintain an acceptable performance of the network.  This makes 
maintaining proper records of performance and maintenance very essential for 
proper operation. 
- A review of the risk identification techniques adopted in literature was undertaken 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1).  Methods like literature review, quantitative content 
analysis, adopting of pre-determined risk lists, interviews, and questionnaire 
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surveys were identified as the main risk identification methods.   
- The literature review included studying research work on other PPP sectors which 
was gathered and grouped by risk categories like PPP political and legal risks, 
financial risks, social risks, and design and construction risks (Chapter 3, Section 
3.4).  These risks were referenced under “Other risks” in the model. 
At the end, 17 water-specific risk elements were identified through cross-checking the 
multiple sources of evidence, and were well defined and described to ensure reliability 
and applicability to most of the water PPP projects.  After the risks are identified, they 
were classified into six groups of like risks. Classification of the risks helps reduce 
redundancy and provides for easier management of the risks in later phases of the risk 
analysis process in the study (Chapter 5, Section 5.2). 
Objective Two: To analyse the interactions among the water-specific risks 
- The literature review showed the interdependency between the various risk 
elements involved in water PPP projects.  For example, the increase of usage is 
expected to lead to an increase in revenue yet it is also associated with an 
increased pressure on the operator towards meeting the performance and 
environmental requirements, which in turn could be affected by the political 
situation and/or other inter-related delayed or underperforming projects.  The 
literature review showed that the risk assessment methods that are typically 
adopted in research and industry are not capable of considering the 
interdependency between the various risk elements.  In addition, the implemented 
strategies have typically considered limited survey results among the project 
team, which cannot offer reliable benchmarked priority assessments of the 
various risk elements.  
- The review showed that with respect to the interdependency between the various 
risk elements, the Analytic Network Process would overcome the shortcomings 
observed in other “typically-used” risk assessment methods. In ANP, hierarchical 
structures are formed as a network structure that showcases interdependency 
amongst the risk elements. The interdependence of network elements allows 
better modelling and prioritization of risks elements. 
- A network structure was constructed to create influence among the project goal, 
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risk categories and elements.  Risk categories: A, B, C, D, E, and F were 
considered as primary standards while sub-variables a1-2, b1-2, c1-3, d1-2, e1-5, 
and f1-3 were considered as secondary standards.  The framework of ANP 
network process for all risks is shown in Figure  7.2.  As shown on the figure, 
there is an outer dependency between the different categories and an inner 
dependency within each member category of risks in the risk prioritization 
structure. Indirect dominance comparison of variables was carried out according 
to their influence on project cost. 
 
Figure  7.2: ANP Network Structure 
Objective Three: To assess the severity of the identified Water-Specific risks 
- Considering the identified water-specific risk elements, a research instrument in 
the form of a self-administered questionnaire was developed.  
- The questionnaire survey was posted on-line through professional networks such 
as LinkedIn on 5 October 2015, providing the experts with a brief of the research 
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project and requesting their collaboration in this research by completing the 
associated questionnaire survey (Chapter 5, Section 5.4).  A total of fifty-three 
(53) responses were received. The professional background of the respondents 
showed that the respondents were competent enough and capable of participating 
in the survey (Chapter 5, Section 5.5). A plausible conclusion therefore is that the 
respondents are sufficiently well vested in water industry. 
First, experts’ decisions were solicited through a risk prioritization survey using a 
Likert type scale of 1 to 5 to score the level of risks impact on water PPP projects 
with respect to cost.   
Second, risk prioritization was performed for the 17 risks identified during the 
literature review.  The Analytical Network Process (ANP) was chosen against 
other alternative methods because of its explanatory nature and considering its 
capability to handle the interdependency between the various risk elements, which 
is a desired function of this research.  The process of developing the ANP model 
includes: model construction, paired comparisons, criteria normalization through 
super matrix calculation, and risk priority index (RPI) calculation. 
The risk assessment process allows for risk impact ranking and categorization into 
very high, high medium, moderate, low and very low impact categories.   
Objective Four: To develop a new model for the assessment of water-specific PPP risks 
The Water-Specific PPP Risk Model was developed as demonstrated in Figure  6.4.  The 
model considered the following aspects: 
- The concept of risk management in PPP (Chapter 3, Section 3.2): Considering that 
proper risk allocation at an early stage of the project is very useful.  For which, 
the model considered an overall risk management strategy that includes the 
several risk management stages (risk identification, analysis, and treatment). 
- Reference to benchmark risk priority indices through the research: These values 
can only be used with caution, as risks are specific to each individual project.  
- Consideration of the interdependency between the various risk elements through 
the use of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) method. 
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- An improvement towards bridging the gap between the academic and the practical 
approach to risk management: The model is easy to understand and use, which 
would encourage practitioners to apply it in their projects 
7.3 Conclusion 
This study has successfully addressed an important research topic in the risk assessment 
literature — the risk assessment of Water PPP Projects.  A model known as the “Water-
Specific PPP Risk Model” was developed to assess the level of identified risks and the 
interactions of such risks impacting the performance of Water PPP Projects. 
The “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” suggested that risk in Water PPP could be 
categorized into six main groups. It can be emphasized that any organizational system can 
improve performance by ensuring these six risk groups have been properly assessed.  
Project managers involved in Water PPP projects must consider all of the risk elements 
during the entire project life cycle. 
During the literature review process, it was evident that the interdependency between risk 
elements was not generally considered in pervious literature.  The proposed risk model 
has successfully introduced the Analytic Network Process to consider such important 
aspect. 
This research developed benchmarked risk priority indices, which can be used as a 
reference and would enhance the risk assessment process of Water PPP projects. 
As noted by Boateng (2014), companies face ever-increasing challenges with respect to 
their investments.  As such, there is heightened awareness on the importance of 
developing well-defined risk models.  Regular and periodic review of the models through 
a formal model validation process can help management and stakeholders gain 
confidence in these critically important business tools. Companies also need to validate 
their models to keep pace with changes in market dynamics; the model validated 
yesterday may not still be valid today given the changes and shifts in the marketplace. Put 
simply, model validation is the quintessential tool in an organization’s model risk 
management process. 
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7.4 Long Term Impact of the New Methodology 
The research successfully developed a risk model that is directly related to Water PPP and 
can enhance the risk assessment and decision making process.  
The Analytic Network Process (ANP) as a Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methodology- 
The model adopts the Analytic Network Process (ANP), which is a multi-criteria decision 
making methodology that can be applied by project consultants to facilitate risk 
identification workshops to conduct risk assessment based on the facilitator’s skills and 
experience in risk elicitation to draw out judgments about uncertain events from the 
project team.  The facilitator can conduct meetings with a smaller group of the most 
experienced project team members to elicit qualitative assessments of the major risks for 
the project. The likelihood and consequences of each risk event can be elicited from each 
team member. For simplicity, the facilitator has to use the discrete scale of 1 - 9 to 
represent the verbal judgment in pairwise comparisons which by applying ANP can 
generate a ranked list of risk priority values of consequences or risk priority indexes (RPI) 
considering the interdependency between the various risk elements. 
Also, the ANP is capable of being used for the selection of the most suitable design or 
construction decisions among various alternatives, which can assist the decision makers 
with concluding with their investment decisions. 
The “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” and Risk Management- To reduce risks, 
companies can use the outputs of the new model for risk management in four steps: risk 
management planning, risk identification, risk analysis, risk response planning. 
- Step 1: Risk Management Planning- Establish the team of experts to analyze the 
new potential water PPP project to assess the feasibility of this project; or to pro-
actively test and improve the existing project plan such as forecasting and 
diagnosing the likely outcomes of the current plan. 
- Step 2: Risk identification- The Water-Specific PPP Risk model can support risk 
identification. The model features the main risk categories and elements proposed 
for initial assessment. It is possible that the risk assessment team would identify 
other risks that have direct or indirect impacts on project outcome. 
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- Step 3: Risk analysis-The model recognizes interdependency between the various 
risk elements and can assist project managers in assessing all risks in a semi-
quantitative manner. The risk prioritization stage should be considered for the 
assessment of risk impacts. 
- Step 4: Risk Response-The model can be effectively used to support a proactive 
risk response as it suggests adopting a risk treatment technique, which would 
vary between risk reduction, avoidance, retention, and risk transfer.  Special 
emphasis was made on risk allocation to ensure that the side that owns the risk is 
the best to manage it.   
The “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” and Project Management - The project manager 
now can better evaluate the risk elements of new projects.  This involves the pre-
assessment stage of risks and considers the interdependency between the various risk 
elements.  The monetary value associated with risk is considered in the Value-for-Money 
analysis.  A subsequent stage of risk monitoring and control by project managers would 
allow for identifying signs of unperceived risk emergence to avoid aggravation.  Risk 
assessors and software developers can implement and further enhance such framework 
for an improved project outcome. 
7.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
In recognition of the special features of the water sector, this research successfully 
developed a risk model specific to this sector. Such consideration to the water specific 
features has been typically overlooked in previous research by implementing a generic 
approach considering generic PPP risk registers.  
The private involvement in the water sector has been a subject of much debate where 
opponents and proponents of private involvement have been both demonstrating figures 
supporting their case.  This research offered the decision maker the platform of applying a 
comparative basis for analysis through the consideration of the interdependency of the 
various risk elements associated with the water sector, where risk identification consists 
of an extensive literature review of previous research, case studies, industry publications, 
and interviews with industry experts. 
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The research in this thesis indicates for the first time the application of ANP to Water PPP 
risks.  This would allow for further consideration of the interdependency between the 
various risks elements, which was overlooked in previous research work conducted on 
PPP.   This approach could be considered in future research work in other infrastructure 
sectors. 
Risk assessment of potential Water PPP projects typically considered the risk assessment 
to be undertaken through a limited-sized group of experts.  This research included 
conducting a survey among industry experts to facilitate establishing benchmarked risk 
priority indices. Since risk remains specific to each project, the developed benchmarked 
values can only be used as a reference, but would certainly enhance the risk assessment 
process. 
The model within this thesis has the capabilities of being used to simulate and support 
behavioural understanding, prediction and evaluation of risks for project planning and 
project performance improvement across a range of alternative PPP sectors. Some of the 
modeling constructs can be used for other project lifecycle models, such as an 
evolutionary risk-driven process.  
The model has the capability to serve as a decision making policy tool with the ability to 
direct policy decisions by testing the effect of different policy scenarios. The insights 
generated will allow policy makers to make informed decisions regarding any future 
policy formulations concerning the risks effect on Water PPP project performance. 
The model offered an improvement towards bridging the gap between the academic and 
the practical approach to risk management of potential Water PPP projects.  The model is 
easy to understand which would encourage practitioners to apply it in their projects.  
7.6 Limitations of the Findings 
As with all survey based research there are bound to be limitations, which need to be 
acknowledged. Readers are therefore reminded of the potential effect of sampling, 
unsystematic (i.e. random) and measurement errors and their likely impact on the data 
collected, analysis undertaken and the conclusions drawn. These notwithstanding, the 
demographic profile of the respondents suggest that they have reasonable involvement 
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and direct professional experience should accord some reasonable credibility to the 
quality of responses received. 
It is also important to acknowledge the relatively small sample size used for the study.  
However, this should not nullify the conclusions drawn, given that the relevant variation 
statistics showed a reasonable deviation. 
It is worth noting that the risks elements considered in this research are those directly 
relevant to the Water PPP planning and subsequent operation and maintenance.  Other 
potential common PPP risks covering the social, construction, political aspects of the 
project should also be considered for a successful PPP, however are considered beyond 
the scope of this research.  Such demarcation should be reflected on the developed Water-
Specific PPP Risk Model.  
Furthermore, the researcher still lacked some real data to demonstrate the validity of the 
risk model developed by the proposed approach. Due to confidentiality reasons, it was not 
possible for public sector officials and contractors to disclose real data. Therefore, 
applying a case with sufficient real data in the future research to test the approach is 
suggested. 
7.7 Recommendations for Further Research 
By this research, it is believed that academic professionals and industrial stakeholders 
could use the findings as a reflective document for initiating the establishment of an 
Association for the Risk Assessment of Water PPP Projects, which could develop the 
project managers’ performance and for benchmarking and best practices during risk 
management.  The following are recommendations for further research: 
- Water Industry Sub-systems: The drinking water and wastewater infrastructure 
collectively known as the Water Sector. This study particularly concentrated on 
the drinking water component, which may include raw water collection, 
transportation, and treatment or could be limited to water distribution to the 
consumers (private houses, industrial, commercial, or institution establishments).  
The risk profile would vary depending on the project scope.  Such differentiation 
was not feasible in this research but could be considered as a future research 
prospective. 
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- Case Study / Life cycle of project - Although the researcher has established the 
theoretical approach that is proved to be valid in developing a risk assessment 
model for water PPP projects, this theory still requires further research to assure 
its realistic representation.  To enhance the model validity, the model parameters 
need to be calibrated by tracing and comparing the results with real project data in 
the future.  The produced “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” considers mainly the 
planning stage of the projects. A methodology like “System Dynamics” could be 
used for studying and management of dynamically complex systems by building 
and applying simulation models to complement the Water-Specific PPP Risk 
Model. 
- Sampling - The results of the questionnaire survey remain limited to the collected 
sample. Further confidence in the results could be established if a larger sample, 
within a specific demographical area, can participate in a similar study. The 
researcher’s effort to engage specific organizations in the research was not 
successful.  While the research aim was considered valuable for such 
organizations, however, their participation was considered not feasible for 
confidentiality reasons. 
Further, the questionnaire survey was directed to water PPP practitioners.  
Someone may argue that some of the main risk factors, relevant to operation and 
maintenance, can be directed to governmental operators that can assist with the 
evaluation of risk elements, regardless of their expertise in PPP.  Perhaps a new 
study can consider this direction, which would offer by far, more confidence on 
results, especially if limited to a certain demographic area. 
- Extension of Risk Criteria - The developed “Water-Specific PPP Risk Model” 
considered the assessment of identified risks with respect to cost.  This approach 
could be further extended to cover other criteria beside cost, like time and quality. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter provided a review of the original research objectives and the extent at which 
they were achieved.  Accordingly, the main conclusions have been presented and the 
limitations of the research have been acknowledged.  Recommendations for further 
research have been proposed. In summary, the research has developed the “Water-
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Specific PPP Risk Model”, which represents a robust mechanism for risk assessment on 
the performance of Water PPP projects.  The model could be used by project managers, to 
reveal the behaviour of risks, and maximize the performance over time.  It is contended 
that the produced model has the potential for improving the outcome of Water PPP 
projects, when uses as a part of a wider sphere of risk management practices and 
procedures. 
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